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INTRODUCTION
American corporations engage in a wide spectrum of activities in
foreign countries to insure the success of their international business
endeavors. One prevalent activity is the payment of money to persons
or officials in the foreign countries who are in a position to further
the interests of the corporation.' These payments may take the form
of payments to foreign consultants and agents, campaign contribu-
tions to political parties and bribery of government officials. Millions
of dollars have been channeled through these payments which often
extend over a period of years.'
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City Law School,
B.A. Cornell University (1963); J.D. Yale Law School (1966).
** Student, University of Missouri-Kansas City Law School.
' Sansweet & Blundell, On the Give, For U.S Firms Abroad, Bribery Can Often Be
Routine Business Cost, Wall St. J., May 9, 1975, at I, col. I.
A Library of Congress analysis indicates that 20 large United States corpora-
tions have been accused of, or have admitted to making, foreign payments totalling
$306 million for "questionable business practices." Most or the corporations concerned
are defense contractors or oil companies. See N.Y. Times, Nov. IS, 1975, at 61, col. 2.
Representative Les Aspin (D-Wis.) released the following list of payments com-
piled by the Library of Congress report:
Amount	 Purpose
American Home Products Corp. 	 $ 750,000 Agents fees
Ashland Oil 	 1,200,000 Foreign payments &
illegal domestic
political contributions
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Corporate political contributions in the host countries comprise a
sizable portion of overseas payments.' Acknowledging such payments,
several corporations maintain that they are customary and in accor-
dance with the laws of the respective host countries.' According to an
Citgo
	
645,000 Overseas payments
Del Monte 	 500,000 Consultant fees
Exxon 	 50,000,000 Overseas payments for legitimate
and illegitimate purposes
FMS Corp.
	
200,000 Agents fees
General Motors 	 475,000 Canadian & S. Korean
political groups
Gulf Oil 	 5,000,000 Illegal political
contributions abroad
ITT 	 39,000 Bribes
IBM 	 180,000 Canadian politicians
Lockheed 	 202,000,000 Consultant fees, political
contributions, foreign agents
Merck & Co. 	 140,000 Assistance in Foreign Sales
McDonnell Douglas 	 190,600 Agents fees
Mobil Oil 	 2,100,000 Italian & Canadian political
contributions
Northrop 	 30,000,000 Bribes & consultants fees
Occidental Petroleum 	 3,000,000 Venezuelan officials
Phillips Petroleum 	 1,400,000 Slush fund
Raytheon 	 1,681,000 Agents fees
United Brands 	 2,000,000 Bribes & contribution to Italian
political groups
Vinnell 	 4,500,000 Agents fees
$306,000,600
Press Release from Congressman Les Aspin, Aspin: U.S. Companies Pay $306 Million for
"Questionable" Business Practices, Nov. 17, 1975, at 2.
3 Wall St. J., July 18, 1975, at 12, col. 2.
4 IBM announced in Aug., 1975, that its Canadian subsidiary, IBM Canada, Ltd.,
contributed an average of $36,000 a year to national and provincial campaigns in the
past five years. Wall St. J., Aug. 4, 1975, at 2, col. 4. In a letter to IBM stockholders,
Chairman Frank T. Cary said that the Board of the subsidiary believed "political con-
tributions by Canadian companies, and in accordance with Canadian laws, are ap-
propriate." However, such payments have been halted due to the parent company's
world-wide policy against political contributions. Letter from Frank T. Cary to the
Stockholders of International Business Machines Corp., Aug. I, 1975, on file at the offices
of the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review. Exxon authorized its Italian
affiliate, Esso Italiana, to pay $27 million to Italian political panics from 1963-71.
Another $19 million in unauthorized political contributions may have been paid. EXXON
CORP., PRELIMINARY PROSPECTUS, EXXON PIPELINE CO. 29-30 (Sept. 30, 1975); 	 N.Y.
Times, July 13, 1975, at 1, col. 5. Exxon Corp. also made political contributions in
Canada, Australia, and Japan. Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1975, at 17, col. 2. DuPont Co. has
admitted making political contributions in Canada of $38,000 (Canadian) since 1971.
Wall St. J., July 22, 1975, at 5, col. 2. A Mobil Oil executive told a Senate subcommittee
that Mobil Oil Italiana contributed an average of $534,000 per year for four years
(1970-73) to three major Italian political parties. Hearings on Political Contributions to
Foreign Governments Before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corps. of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 12, at 316 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hear-
ings on Political Contributions] (Statement of Everett S. Checkett, Exec. V.P., Inel Div.,
Mobil Oil Corp.).
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executive vice-president of Mobil Oil Corporation, "in many countries
including Italy, corporate contributions to the political process are
perfectly legal and considered ethically proper as well." Even where
political contributions are illegal, corporate officials are often unaware
of this fact and make the contribution on the basis of their erroneous
understanding of the host nation's laws. At least one American corpo-
rate official, maintaining his belief that it was legal at the time, has
admitted contributing four million dollars to the political parties of a
country which in fact prohibited such payments.°
Payments are often justified on the grounds that they are essen-
tial to "protect democracy"7 or to continue doing business in the re-
spective host countries. Indeed, company executives declare that
foreign political parties and governmental officials exert intense pres-
sure for contributions and that if the payments are not forthcoming,
the corporation may be precluded from doing business in the
country.° Such payments have also been defended as consistent with
the accepted way of doing business in foreign nations)° Cessation of
payments by American firms might mean the loss of substantial
amounts of business to their foreign rivals, who acquiesce to demands
for, or expectation of, such payments.'° If the payments are not
° Senate Hearings on Political Contributions, supra note 4, at 321 (statement of
Everett S. Checkett). Canada and Italy apparently are two major countries in which
political contributions by foreign corporations are legal. Wall St. J., May 19, 1975, at I,
col. 6.
° Former Gulf Oil Corp. Chairman B.R. Dorsey claims he only recently became
aware that payments to the controlling political party in Korea in fact violate a Korean
statute. Dorsey asserts he was pressured into making contributions of $1 million in 1966
and $3 million in 1970 to the Democratic Republic Party of the Republic of Korea. Ac-
cording to Dorsey, such payments were necessary in order for Gulf to stay in business
there. Senate Hearings on Political Contributions, supra note 4, at 9-10 (Statement of B.R.
Dorsey, Chairman, Gulf Oil Corp.). See also Wall St. J., May 2, 1975, at I, col. 6. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., in correspondence with the Senate Foreign Relations Subcomm. on
Multinational Corps., indicated that a partner in its Korean venture also made an unau-
thorized political contribution of $250,000 in Korea in 1972 which General Motors has
been attempting to recover. Because control of General Motors Korea is equally divided
between G.M. representatives and its Korean partner, G.M. efforts to recover the
money thus far have been unsuccessful. Carley, When in Rome . . . Oil Company Gifts to
Political Parties Stir Inquiries in Italy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 19.75, at 39, col. 6.
This argument is particularly recurrent with regard to payments in Italy. Wall
St. J., May 19, 1975, at 1, col. 6. See Senate Hearings on Political Contributions, supra note
4, at 318 (statement of Everett S. Checkett); Wall St. J., July 18, 1975, at 3, col, 2.
g Senate Hearings on Political Contributions, supra note 4, at 8 (statement of B.R.
Dorsey).
° According to the New York Times, former Commerce Secretary Rogers C.B.
Morton believes American companies have little choice but to engage in kickback
schemes. Apparently referring to the Middle East, Morton is quoted as saying, "It's per-
fectly obvious that business is not done on the same ethical level across the world."
While not condoning such practices, he noted that "this is the way business has been
done since time began." N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1975, at 59, col. 8. See also Jensen, Many U.S.
Executives Reported in Favor of Overseas Bribes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1976, at 45, col. 1
(Conference Board study).
'° Sansweet & Blundell, On the Give, For U.S. Firms Abroad, Bribery Can Often Be
Routine Business Cost, Wall St. J., May 9, 1975, at 1, col. 1. This argument is weakened
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made, the executives argue, the foreign government may raise taxes,
revoke licenses, or refuse to grant permission for proposed company
actions. Nationalization or expropriation of the company's assets is, of
course, the ultimate reprisal."
A large portion of overseas corporate payments also goes to
"consultants" and foreign agents as commissions and fees.' 2 The role
of these consultants and sales agents, who are often former high rank-
ing American and foreign military officials,'' is controversial. Corpo-
somewhat by the fact that not all companies yield to the local government's demand for
payoffs. Id.
"See Wall St. J., April 9, 1975, at I, col. 6.
" A Northrop Corporation report, for example, issued by its Executive Commit-
tee stated that of $30 million related to disbursements made or committed overseas,
"nearly all was paid according to agreements with consultants and commission agents.
REPORT To THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF NORTHROP CORPORATION ON THE SPECIAL
INVESTIGATION OF TIIE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 59 (July 16, 1975) [hereinafter cited as
NORTHROP DIRECTORS REPORT). For an extensive compilation of documents relating to
foreign sales and operation of the Northrop Corp., see Senate Hearings an Political Con-
tributions, supra note 4, at 393-932; See Wall St. J., July 18, 1975. at 19, col. 2. Company
documents released by the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational
Corporations indicate Lockheed Aircraft Corp. made payments of at least $106 million
in agents' commissions in Saudi Arabia alone from 1970 to mid-I975. N.Y. Times, Sept.
13, 1975, at 31, col. 8. Documents relating to foreign sales and operations of Lockheed
are collected in Senate Hearings on Political Contributions, supra note 4, at 933-1171. Lock-
heed disclosed that it has paid or appropriated over $200 million for foreign consul-
tants and other fees since 1970. Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1975, at 8, col. 2. Such payments,
however,later cost Lockheed a $1.3 billion sale to Japan. N.Y. Times, Feb. I I, 1976, at
I, col. 6. Lockheed officials have acknowledged that the company knows or suspects
that $22 million flowed to officials or political parties overseas. Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1976,
at 4, col. 2. The Grumman Corp., a large defense contractor. recently admitted that it
agreed to pay Iranian lobbyists more than $20 million in commissions over a five-year
period as part of a $2 billion sale of 80 F-I4 Tomcat fighter planes to Iran. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 13, 1975, at 37, col. 3. Reactions of the Iranian government to the agents' fees
paid by Grumman include seeking a $28 million rebate from the company and report-
edly deciding not to order more Grumman F-I4 planes. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1976, §
at 34, col. 3; N.Y. Times Feb. 18, 1976, at 45, col. 2. See N.Y. Times, Feb. I I, 1976, at
66, col. I. McDonnell Douglas Corp. has disclosed foreign payments of $2.5 million.in
the form of fees, commissions and consultant payments, apparently to government offi-
cials, from 1970 to 1975. The corporation asserts that none of the payments were illegal
or made in connection with military aircraft. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1975, at 35, col. 5.
See atm "Agent's Fees In The Middle East," Hearings on the Activities of American Multina-
tional Corps. Abroad Before the Subcomm. on Ina Econ. Polity of the House Comm. on Intl Re-
lations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 100-03 (1975); Statement of Lt. Gen. Howard NI. Fish,
Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Hearings, supra, at 103; Statement of
Brig. Gen. James W. Stansberry, Deputy Ass't Sec. of Defense (Procurement, IIIM21111-
Dons, and Logistics), id. at 129; Statement of Thomas P. Stern, Dep. Dir. of the Bureau
of Politico-Military Affairs; U.S. Dept. of State. id. at 158-159; Statement of Adnan M.
Khashoggi, on Triad Marketing for U.S. Defense Material Manufacturers, id.,
Appendix 15, at 272-73. In Bolivia, kr instance, foreign corporations are required by
law to carry on their business through local agents or subsidiaries. In N.Y. Times, May
27, 1975, at 39, col. I. Representative Les Aspin has released Pentagon documents indi-
cating that five foreign agents have received $18.7 million in fees for $500 million in
military sales in Jordan, Israel, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia since mid-1973. The largest
fee, $8,886,000, was paid to the Triad Financial Establishment, operated by Saudi
businessman Adnan M. Khashoggi, in connection with aircraft sales to Saudi Arabia.
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rate officials assert that the services of foreign agents are necessary
because it is financially impractical for a firm to establish offices in
every country which might be a potential customer." Officials further
allege that consultants in foreign countries perform valuable services
by providing technical, legal, financial, and marketing advice in a
manner similar to consultants in the United States.'" In describing the
duties of one such consultant-a former French general-the presi-
dent of Northrop Corporation said the general assumed primary re-
sponsibility for "the analysis of all political, economic and military
situations in Europe, with changing relationships between principal
countries and emphasis on defense-related programs."'" The general's
secondary responsibility, according to the president of Northrop, was
to alert the corporation to business opportunities in defense-related
areas as they arose."
Despite these apparently legitimate services performed by some
consultants of multinational corporations, consultants may serve as
conduits to transmit bribes to influential officials in foreign
governments.'" Foreign consultants are characterized as "influence
peddlers" who know "who to talk to and whose pockets to line in a
particular country to get the job done."'" According to a former cor-
Release by Representative Les Aspin, Aspin: $18.7 Million In Agents Fees in Middle East,
Sept. 29, 1975. A report reviewing Northrop's consultant costs prepared by the Defense
Contract Audit Agency, has recommended that the Defense Department reconsider
Triad's status as a sales agent under the Armed Service Procurement Regulation (see
notes 156-159 infra) for the period 1971-74 due to the possibility Triad may have used
"improper influence" in arranging Foreign Military Sales contracts. Report on Special
Review of Consultant Costs and Other Matters, Northrop Corporation, to Dept. of the
Air Force, Air Force Contract Mgmt. Div. (AFSC) from Defense Contract Audit
Agency, Aug. 6, 1975, at 10 [hereinafter cited as Air Force Report]; id. Exhibit B, Note 1, at
19-23.
13 Northrop Corp. has disclosed that it employed several former high ranking
American and foreign military officers as consultants. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1975, at 55,
col. 5. In the Middle East, prominent businessmen with close ties to foreign govern-
ments are often engaged as agents. For an account of one of the more successful Mid-
dle East agents, see Servant of the Sheik, FORBES, June 15, 1975 at 45.
Nommor DIRECTORS REPORT,Slipra note 12, at 47. Wall St. J., June 10, 1975,
at 8, col. 2.
' 4 E.g., NORTHROP DIRECTORS REpowr, supra note 12, at 47; N.Y. Times, June 6,
1975, at 41, col. 5.
" N.Y. Times, June 7, 1975, at I, col. 7.
"Id. Duties of other Northrop consultants are discussed in N.Y. Times, June 26,
1975, at 55, col. 5. For a review of Northrop consultant services and certain payments
determined by the Defense Contract Audit Agency to be "questionable" as allowable
costs under Foreign Military Sales contracts, see Air Force Report, supra note 12 at
33-62. Services provided by Northrop consultants and the compensation paid therefore
are also discussed in NORTHROP DIRECTORS REPORT-Mina note 12, at 6-46.
"See Air Force Report, supra note 12, at 10, 21-22; N.Y. Times, Aug. II, 1976,
at I, col. 6.
" Former Northrop executive, John R.' Hunt, as quoted in a document in the
possession of a Senate subcommittee. Wall St. J., June 10, 1975, at 8, col. 2. In some
countries, it is allegedly necessary to have a local agent in order to bribe local officials as
the officials will only accept payment from someone they have known and trusted for
years. Wall St. J., May 9, 1975, at 2, col. I
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porate executive, corporations often pay their consultants on a no-
questions-asked basis, preferring not to know how the agents
operate. 2° Senator Frank Church ably summed up the dispute over the
services provided by agents and consultants when he concluded that
some agents and consultants clearly provide legitimate technical or
political advice to the company while others apparently are guilty of il-
legal payoffs, but "[lin between these two extremes is a gray area of
questionable legitimacy .... ”21
Companies manifest a closed attitude in discussing whether con-
sultants use a portion of their fees for various forms of illegal payoffs.
Several companies have acknowledged making payments to foreign
governmental officials either directly or through agents. 22 As in the
case of political contributions, however, these firms often contend that
the foreign agents and governmental officials extorted such
payments" and that the companies had no choice but to make the
1" Illustrative of this practice is the Economic and Development Corporation
(EDC), a Swiss-based company organized in 1971 to promote the interest of Northrop
by working "behind the scenes through the use of the right people in the right places."
Reportedly EDC efforts resulted in commissions of over $3 million for the sale of
Northrop aircraft; however, former Northrop chairman, Thomas E. Jones, was quoted
as saying he had never met the people behind EDC. The organizer of EDC, Frank J.
DeFrancis, is said to have commented that Northrop did not care to know precisely how
EDC operated. Wall St. J., June 9, 1975, at 4, col. 2. For Northrop's description of
EDC, see NORTHROP DIRECTORS REPORT.SUpra note 12, at 9-13; Senate Hearings on Politi-
cal Contributions, supra note 4, at 409-21. Often the costs of these fees are recouped by
product mark-ups. Wall St. J., May 9, 1975, at I, Col. 1,
22 N.Y. Times, June 7, 1975, at I, col. 7.
22 The Northrop Corp. has disclosed that it gave a Middle East businessman
$450,000 for the purpose of bribing two Saudi Arabian generals in 1972 and 1973.
NORTHROP DIRECTORS REPORT, supra note 12, at 21-25; N.Y. Times, June 10, 1975, at
55, col. 5. United Brands has admitted that it deposited $1.25 million in a Swiss bank
account designated by a Honduran official "in connection with discussions regarding a
tax on the export of bananas imposed by that country." Answer, SEC v. United Brands
Co., Civil Action No. 75-0509 at 2 (D.D.C., filed July 25, 1975). See also Wall St. J.,
April 9, 1975, at I, col. 6; N.Y. Times, May 17, 1975, at 33, col. 1. United Brands has
denied charges by the SEC that it made cash payments of approximately $750,000 to
European governmental officials between 1970 and 1975 "in connection with the secur-
ing of favorable business opportunities." Answer, SEC v. United Brands Co., supra at I;
see Complaint, SEC v. United Brands Co., Civil Action No. 75-0509 at 4 (D.D.C., filed
Apr. 9, 1975). However, according to press reports, United Brands has publicly admit-
ted these payments. Maidenberg, New Rules, Harsh Life in Bananas, N.Y. Times, May 11,
1975, § 3, at I, col. 7; Wall St. J., Aug. 19, 1975, at 7, col. I; N.Y. Times, Aug. 19,
1975, at 45, col. 2. Apparently the company did not reveal the purpose of these pay-
ments. Ashland Oil, Inc., in a report filed with the SEC divulged payments of $150,000
and $40,000 to two government officials in Gabon, East Africa. I REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ASHLAND OIL, INC.. June 26, 1975, at
123. For details of Ashland's other overseas payments, see id. at 116-129. See also N.Y.
Times, June 28, 1975, at 35, col. 6. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. said that
one of its smaller foreign subsidiaries paid a $52,000 bribe in mid-1975 to a customs
agent to avoid penalties for evading customs payments. Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1975, at 6,
col. I.
13 United Brands claims that pressure was placed on Eli Black, company presi-
dent, by Honduran officials. N.Y. Times, May 17, 1975, at 33, col. I. Wall St. J., Apr. 9,
1975, at I, col. 6. If in fact the companies were coerced into making such payments,
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payments if they wished to continue doing business.24 To a certain ex-
tent this contention is buttressed by evidence suggesting that, at least
in some instances, what began as bribery may have evolved into extor-
tion as government officials, realizing their power over the firms' in-
terests in their respective countries, have forced the corporations to
continue the payments.25
Corporations also expend funds abroad in efforts to overthrow
or "destabilize" a host government." The desire to gain relief from
unfavorable policies of the govermiient in power or the desire to pre-
vent the election of officials who might jeopardize company interests
leads firms to undertake such a course of conduct. The most infa-
mous example of this conduct is the activities of International Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company in Chile in 1970. A report of the
Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee concluded that "the highest officials of the ITT
sought to engage the CIA in a plan covertly to manipulate the out-
come of the Chilean presidential election. In so doing the company
overstepped the line of acceptable corporate behavior."22 More re-
cently, a Costa Rican official accused three American companies of
conspiring against Central American banana-producing states to pre-
vent such countries from raising export taxes. The official specifically
charged, on the basis of unconfirmed reports, that the companies had
established a $5 million secret fun& to promote the destablization of
governments supporting the taxes."
they would not appear to Meet the definition of bribery because the payments were not
made voluntarily. Bribery is "the Voluntary giving or receiving of anything of value in
corrupt payment for an official act done or to be done or with the corrupt intent to in-
fluence the action of a public official or of any other person professionally concerned
with the administration of public affairs...." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 155 (3d
ed. 1969) (emphasis added).
"Hearings on Lockheed Bribery Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1975) (Statement of D.J. Houghton, Chairman of the
Board, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.).
25 Wall St. J., May 19. 1975, at I, col. 6. Italian investigators recently conducted
inquiries into the large contributions paid by some American oil companies to Italian
political parties. The size of the contributions led to speculation that these payments
may have actually been "veiled bribes" aimed at securing specific benefits from the
Italian parliament. Apparently some investigators believe that what began as contribu-
tions later became bribery, and finally extortion by Italian politicians. But see Carley,
Fiasco in Italy Political Slush Fund Hid Other Spending, Cost Exxon Millions, Wall St. J., Nov.
14, 1975, at I, col. 6. The failure of corporations to seek the assistance of and support
by United States governmental authorities weakens the argument that the payments
were extorted.
26 DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, THE IMPACT OF MUUFINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, U.N. DOC.
E/5500/Rev. I ST/ESA/6 at 45-46 (1974).
27 REPORT TO 'Inc SENATE COMMEITEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS BY THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND
TELEGRAPH COMPANY AND CHILE, 1970-71, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18. See also A. SAMPSON,
TIIE SOVEREIGN STATE OF in 259-88 (1973).
28 Wall St. J., May 21, 1975, at 4, col. 2.
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As important as the purposes for which the corporate funds are
expended is the manner in which corporations allocate the money for
use in making overseas payments and the way such payments are re-
corded on the corporate books. Different companies use various
methods of allocating and recording foreign political payments to dis-
guise or "launder" the funds earmarked for overseas payments. Thus,
firms may create secret "slush funds" from which payments can be
made with little or no accountability. 29 For example, Gulf accumulated
a slush fund by recording the transfer of funds to a dummy Baha-
mian subsidiary as capital contributions to the subsidiary. These funds
were then recorded as deferred charges and expenses on the
subsidiary's books." According to a Gulf vice-president, the firm
29 What Ashland Oil Said About Itself, Bus. WEEK, July 21, 1975, at 17. The mechan-
ics of Ashland Oil's overseas funds transfers are detailed in I REPORT OF THE SPECIAL.
COMMITTEE TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ASHLAND OIL. INC.. June 26, 1975, at 116-20.
Lockheed allegedly resisted Indonesian Air Force officials'demands that "commissions"
be deposited directly into a Singapore bank account by Lockheed. Lockheed preferred
the use of an intermediary dummy corporation or Lockheed subsidiary, fearing that di-
rect payments would not be allowed as deductions by the Internal Revenue Service and
that subsequent public disclosure of such payments might damage Lockheed's name
and reputation. Carley, Crease or Grit? Lockheed's Payoffs To Indonesians Were Difficult To
Arrange, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1975, at I, col. 6. For Lockheed documents relating to its
sales in Indonesia, see Senate Hearings on Political Contributions, supra note 4, at 935-1000.
Exxon reportedly established a "Special Budget" to make secret political pay-
ments in Italy. According to the Wall St. Journal, the company accounted for funds dis-
bursed from the Special Budget by paying fake or dummy invoices from political party
newspapers for advertising or surveys (such payments thus becoming tax deductible as
"business expense") and by establishing a secret bank account (not recorded on com-
pany books) funded from various rebates and kickbacks. Company officials received
cash from the bank account, then transmitted it to party newspapers. While $27 million
was authorized for payments under the Special Budget, the President of Esso Habana
apparently utilized 40 secret bank accounts and tapped Exxon's operating budget to
make another $29 to $32 million in unauthorized payments. Carley, Fiasco in Italy: Polit-
ical Slush Fund Hid Other Spending, Cost Exxon Millions, Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 1975, at I,
col. 6. EXXON CORI'. PRELIMINARY PROSPECTUS, EXXON PIPELINE Co. 29-30 (Sept. 30,
1975). Exxon's operations in Italy are discussed in detail in testimony before a Senate
subcommittee by Exxon controller Archie Moore, Senate Hearings on Political Contribu-
tions, supra note 4, at 241-67. A report submitted to the SEC by Phillips Petroleum Co.
stated that two Swiss corporations were organized by Swiss nationals as a means of ac-
cumulating funds. Of $2,856,000 received by the Swiss corporations, 11,350,000 was
withdrawn from the accounts of the Swiss corporations in cash, transferred to the com-
pany headquarters, and deposited in the cash fund." Form 8, Amendment to Applica-
tion or Report of Phillips Petroleum Co., at 3-4, as quoted in Address by Stanley Spur-
kin, Director, SEC Enforcement Div., National Ass'n of Accountants, Oct. 15, 1975 at
4-5, on file at the offices of the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Reveiw.
"Senate Hearings on Political contributions, supra note 4, at 12 (statement of B.R.
Dorsey). Gulf allegedly diverted $10.3 million to its slush fund between 1960 and 1973.
Approximately half went for foreign payments; the remainder was utilized for illegal
domestic political contributions. Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1975, at 30, col. I; Wall St. J., Nov.
12, 1975, at 3, col. 2; Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1975, at 40, col. 2. For a more detailed de-
scription of the workings of the Gulf slush fund payments, see N.Y. Times, Nov. 26,
1975, at I, col. I; Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1975, at 30, col. 1; Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1975, at
5, col. I.
Castle & Cooke also maintained a separate account from which its overseas pay-
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placed the funds in a Swiss account for later use. 3 ' Ashland Oil also
created a slush fund by recording non-existent expenses on a foreign
subsidiary's books while, in fact, routing the money to an overseas
bank." Even where corporate funds are not "laundered" by channel-
ing payments through a foreign subsidiary or foreign bank account,
but are transferred directly from the corporation to the recipient, the
company's books often list the payments as "advertising and research"
expenses or other such expenditures. 33
The foreign payments, the irregular manner in which corpora-
tions establish slush funds, and more significantly, the practice of fal-
sifying corporate books have created a myriad of legal problems for
the companies."Among the headaches which the disclosure of such
practices has brought are shareholder derivative suits alleging, under
state law, the waste and misuse of corporate assets and the breach of
fiduciary duties by corporate officers and directors." Other share-
meats were paid. The company has said that money paid to expedite shipments and
provide security services for company operations in Latin America was from a special
account provided for that purpose. Payments were shown on the books as "first cost of
fruit." Castle & Cooke acknowledged distributing approximately $800,000 over the last
ten years. The company indicates it considers such payments proper and is continuing
them. "They weren't made to obtain preferential business treatment," a company
spokesman declared. Wall St. J., Nov. 26, 1975, at 2, col. 2. Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1975,
at 7, col. I.
31 Wall St. J., May 2, 1975, at I, col. 6.
32 What Ashland Oil Said About Itself, Bus. WEEK. July 21, 1975, at 17; Wall St. J.,
July 15, 1975, at 5, col. 2.
33 Explanations given for the cover-ups are that nondisclosure of recipients was
customary in the host country. Wall St. J., July 15, 1975, at 4, col. 2. Mobil Oil's Execu-
tive Vice-President of its International Division, Everett S. Checkett, told a Senate Sub-
committee that all contributions to Italian political parties "were made from Mobil's
normal business accounts, by company check or bank remittance. These contributions
were not paid from any secret fund, and did not involve any out-of-country financial
transactions." Senate Hearings on Politician Contributions, supra note 4, at 316 (statement of
Everett S. Checkett). However, questioning by Senators revealed that the payments
were shown on Mobil Italiana's books as advertising and research expenses at the re-
quest of the political parties. Id. at 317. Wall St. J., July 18, 1975, at 12, col. 2. Exxon
recorded $20 million in political contributions in Italy as payments to various news-
papers, publicity agencies, and other organizations. EXXON CORP., PRELIMINARY
PROSPECITS, EXXON PIPELINE Co. 29-30 (Sept. 30, 1975). Merck & Co. recorded a politi-
cal contribution as a promotional expense "in keeping with the custom ... not to ac-
knowledge corporate political contributions." Merck & Co., Form 8-K Current Report to
SEC 2 (Dec. 17, 1975).
34 For example, Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. has filed a petition with
the ECG alleging that General Tire & Rubber Co. channeled pay-offs to public officials
or political parties in Chile, Morocco and Rumania. Wall St. J., Dec. II, 1975, at 7, col.
I. General Tire owns 36% of Chile's largest tire-making company whose manager sup-
posedly established a secret Liechtenstein bank account from which some payments
were made. Wall St. J., July 3, 1975, at 24, col, 2.
" Among the companies beset by shareholder derivative suits are Exxon Corp.,
United Brands Co., Gulf Oil Corp., Ashland Oil, inc., and International Telephone and
Telegraph Corp. Derivative suits against Exxon and certain past and present directors
allege that Exxon's assets were wasted and impaired by the expenditure of more than
$50 million as improper political contributions in Italy and as bribes for political favors
or other unlawful purposes without an accounting or disclosure, and by the falsification
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holder suits allege violations of certain provisions of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and the rules promulgated thereunder. 36 At the
administrative level, the Securities and Exchange Commission has as-
sumed primary responsibility for forcing disclosure of the foreign ac-
tivities of American multinational corporations.
• This article will explore solutions to the problem of adequate
standards and procedures for the national and transnational regula-
tion of the conduct of American multinational corporations. Initially,
the focus will be upon a national solution: regulation by the
SEC-under the , traditional disclosure doctrine and the emerging
standard of integrity disclosure-and by the executive and legislative
branches, of the federal government. A transnational solution will then
be discussed, culminating in the formulation of a transnational code
of conduct to regulate corporate activity in foreign nations. It is the
of corporate books to hide the diversion of corporate assets. EXXON CORP., PRELIMINARY
PROSPECTUS, EXXON PIPELINE CO. 28-29 (Sept. 30, 1975). Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1975, at 3,
col. 2. After an investigation, however, the Exxon corporation found no basis for taking
action against its officers regarding the Italian payoffs. Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1976, at 7,
col. 2; N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1976, at 33, col. I.
The United Brands suits, also brought against the company and certain past and
present executives, involve the alleged payment of bribes to foreign officials from 1970
to 1975, falsification of corporate books, filing of false and fraudulent income tax re-
turns, and the filing of false and fraudulent reports and financial statements concealing
such bribes. The plaintiffs contend that the defendant directors and officers breached
their fiduciary duties by approving such activities and that United Brands has or may
be damaged by litigation instituted as a result of these activities, by punitive action by
the government of Honduras and other Central American countries, by fines and
penalties that will result from the filing of false income tax returns, and by the loss of
goodwill and reputation. Garfield v. Doriot, Index No. 13517/1975 at 7-12 (S. Ct. N.Y.).
See Lewis v. Brangwynne, Index No. 6364/1975 at 4-7 (S. Ct. N.Y.). Shareholder suits
against Gulf Oil Corp. are noted in Calame, Stonewalling It at Gulf Oil, Wall St. J., Apr.
18, 1975, at 12, col. 4; Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1975, at 40, col. 2; Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1975, at
15, col. 3; against Lockheed, in Wall St. J., Feb. 18, 1976, at 4, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Feb.
25, 1976, at 49, col. 4, Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1976, at 30, col. 2.
The action against Ashland Oil asserts that the defendant directors and officers
"fraudulently, wrongfully and negligently suffered and caused the moneys, property
and effects of ASHLAND to be wasted, squandered and impaired ...." Levin v. At-
kins, Civ. Action No. C-75-0095L(B) at 5 (W.D. Ky. 1975). For a copy of the first
amended complaint in Levin, see II REPORT OF THE SPECIAL. COMMITTEE TO THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS OF ASHLAND On., 1NG, Exhibit 28 (June 26, 1975). A shareholder suit
brought against ITT by New Jersey State Senator Anne. Martindeil alleged that ITT
engaged in illegal political activities in Chile in 1970., The parties reached a settlement
that cleared the company of the allegation, but required ITT senior executives to cer-
tify yearly that they have not interfered in the political process of any country. See Wall
St. J., Aug. 20, 1975, at II, col. I. For an analysis of the duty of care and the liability
for wasting corporate assets, see H. HENN. HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
453-57 (2d ed. 1970).
3° A consolidated action filed against United Brands in the Southern District of
New York alleges violations of 11 10(b), 13(a), and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. // 78j(b), 78m(a), 78n(a) (1970) and Rules 106-5, 13a-1, 13a-I I,
13a-13, and 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. 11 240.106-5, 240.13a-I, 240.13a-11, 240.13a-I3,
240.14a-9 (1975). Meer v. United Brands Co., 75 Civ. 1738, 1739, 1761 at 2-27
(S.D.N.Y., filed Sept. 1975). See Levin v. Atkins, Civ. Action No. C-75-0095L(B) at 2
(W.D. Ky. 1975) (alleging violations of 11 10(b) and 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act).
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ultimate purpose of this article to demonstrate that a purely national
solution is less desirable than transnational regulation, as such a na-
tional solution would adversely affect the position of American firms
abroad by opening them up to possible reprisals from the host coun-
tries and to discrimination in favor of non-American, nonregulated
companies. A need, therefore, exists for transnational regulation of
multinational firms. Many obstacles, however, including the differing
interests of developed and developing nations, presently impede the
adoption of such a transnational code of conduct.
I. DISCLOSURE OF FOREIGN ACTIVITIES OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS
UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
The disclosure requirements of the securities laws have been the
principle means through which the SEC has attempted to regulate the
international activities of American corporations. The concept of dis-
closure underpins both the Securities Act of 193337 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.38 Congress apparently concluded that disclo-
sure would achieve the dual goal of informing investors and inhibiting
illegal and unethical activities by issuers, corporate insiders, brokers-
dealers and others engaged in various aspects of the securities
industry.39 This reliance on the concept of disclosure resulted in sev-
eral specific provisions in the statutes. For example, detailed disclos-
ures are required whenever a corporation publicly offers its securities
for sale,4° periodic reports must be filed with the SEC,4' and informa-
tive proxy materials must be furnished to shareholders.'" The Se-
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1970).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1970).
" See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 564
(E.D.N.Y. 1971). Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A
Brief Review, 25 HAFriNGs L.J. 311,319-20 (1974). The flexibility of disclosure as a
regulatory mechanisin was perceived as an additional advantage. See Knauss,, A Reap-
praisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 Mien. L. REV. 607 (1964).
4° Securities Act of 1933 §§ 5, 7, Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, g, aa (Schedule
A) (1970). See generally H. BLOOMENTIIAL. SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW §
1.03 (1975). Section I2(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(a)
(1970) requires the registration of securities listed on national securities exchanges. Sec-
tion I2(g) of the Securities Exchange Au of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78/(g) (1970) requires
registration of securities traded in the over-the-counter market where an issuer of such
a security has assets aggregating at least $1 million and the security constitutes a class of
equity securities held of record by at least 500 persons. See generally H. BLOOMENTHAL
SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 1.03 (1975).
"Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12, 13, 15, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, m, o (1970).
See Rules 13a-I, I 3a-I3, 17 C.F. R. §§ 240.13a-I, 240.13a-13 (1975). Reporting com-
panies must file a general registration forth, Form 10, 3 CCH FED, SEC. L. REP.
1127,30 I(text of form), 27,302 (instructions); update the registration statement annually
by filing a Form 10-K, id. at 1131,101 (text of form), 31,102 (instructions); file a quar-
terly report, Form 10-Q, id. at 1131,035 (text of form), 31,031 (instructions); and where
necessary, file a monthly Form 8-K, id. at 11 31,001 (text of form), 31,002 (instructions).
42 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970). For a discussion
of the proxy statements, see 2 L. Loss. SECURITIES REGULATION 876-89 (2d ed. 1961); H.
BLOOMENTIIAL SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW § 13.08 (1975). An issuer
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curities Exchange Act also contains a broad antifraud provision which
resulted in the promulgation of Rule 10b-5 by the SEC. 43
Issuers with securities listed on national securities exchanges
have additional disclosure obligations. The New York Stock Exchange
Rules, for example, state that "a corporation whose stock is listed on
the New York Stock Exchange is expected to release quickly to the
public any news or informaton which might reasonably be expected to
materially affect the market for securities."'"
The applicability of Rule 10b-5 to corporate activities in foreign
countries does not focus upon trading by insiders but upon the timing
of the disclosure of facts. It has been held that, absent insider trading,
the timing of the disclosure of material facts is a matter of business
judgment"' and that "information about which the issues revolve must
be 'available and ripe for publication' before there commences a duty
to disclose." 46 Thus, if an issuer withholds disclosure in the honest
and reasonable belief that a valid corporate justification exists or that
sufficient facts are not available to the corporation to permit release
of a non-misleading statement, such postponement may shield a cor-
poration against liability under Rule 106-5. Consequently, a corpora-
tion which has made foreign payments might defend itself in a Rule
10b-5 action by claiming that the information was not "ripe" and that
must also provide its shareholders with an annual report, which accompanies or pre-
cedes the receipt of proxy materials if a shareholders' meeting involves the election of
directors. See Rule 14a-3(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (1975).
"Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). Rule
106-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.106-5 (1975). For an anecdotal recounting of the promulgation of Rule
1013-5 see Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW 793, 922
(1967); see also I A. BROS/BERG. SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, SEC RULE 1013-5 § 2.2 (1975).
For an analysis of the elements of a cause of action for violation of Rule 1013-5, see A.
JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 1013-5 §§ 36-67 (1974).
" NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL A(2) at A-I8. The New York
Stock Exchange mandate contains an exception for an issuer who is able to confine the
information to a small group of top management where adequate security can prevent
leakage. Once the group of individuals aware of the information begins to grow, the
corporation has a duty to disclose. /d. at A-I9. See also AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE
COMPANY GUIDE 101-113.
" Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 518
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S: 874 (1973).
" 474 F.2d at 518.
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its withholding was an exercise of discretionary business judgment. 47
Akin to the requirement of disclostire is the concept of material-
ity, which runs through the disclosure provisions under both the 1933
and 1934 Acts. 48 The securities laws mandate the disclosure of material
facts.'" In defining "material" facts, judicial interpretations have
tended to adopt a "reasonable investor" approach, 5° eschewing a test
focusing solely on the market impact of the disclosure. 5 ' Application
of the definition to specific actions or events has given rise to prob-
lems, however." Whether a particular fact is material depends upon
" See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.; 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See also A. JAGoBs, THE IMPACT OF RULE 106-5 § 88.04
at 4-7 n.I5 (1974).
"E.g., Securities Act of 1933 §§ 8(b), 10(b), 11(a), 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h(b),
77j(b), 77k(a), 771 (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 14(e), 18(a), 15 U.S.C.
78n(e), 77r(a) (1970).
49 The broad language of Rule 1013-5, which prohibits the nondisclosure of any
material fact, governs statements made in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1013-5 (1975). Similarly, Reg. C, governing registration of se-
curities under the Securities Act of 1933, provides:
In addition to the information expressly required to be included in
a registration statement, there shall.: be added such further material
information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements,
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not mislead-
ing.
Rule 408, 17 C.F.R. 230.408 (1975) (emphaSis added). See also Rule I4a-9, 17 C.F.R.
240. 14a-9 (1975). See generally SEC, Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registration
Statements, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 3,760.
" See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United ;States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-154 (1972)(Rule
106-5); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970) (Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 14(a)); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en bane), cert denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (Rule 106-5); List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,'340
. F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
51 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The SEC's definition of materiality fuses both the im-
pact on investors and on the market price of a stock. Investors Mgmt. Co,, SEC Se-
curities and Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July -29, 1971), H970-1971 Transfer
Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L. ,REP. 1 78,163 at 80,519. For another effort at the reconcilia-
tion of the importance to the reasonable investor and the market impact standards, see
SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 478 n.5 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane) (Moore,
J., dissenting), cert., denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969).
"2 instance, events which are likely to be deemed material are negotiations
concerning acquisitions, mergers, and joint ventures; changes in dividend rates or earn-
ings; new contracts or loss of a significant contract; annual and quarterly earnings; un-
favorable news; financial results and forecasts; a change in management or significant
control changes, write-offs; change of accounting methods; dispute with suppliers or
customers and significant litigation. H. I31.00MENTHAI„ SECURITIES AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAW § 9.13 (1975); NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL §A(2) at A-22;
AMERICAN S'IOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY GUIDE 103-04.
In SEC v. Lum's, Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. II
93,659 at 92,947 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the court noted that materiality is presunied for the
following: dividend increases or decreases, earnings estimates, significant expansion or
curtailment of operations, a significant increase or decrease of orders, significant
merger or acquisition proposals or agreements, significant new products or discoveries,
extraordinary borrowing, major litigation, liquidity problems, extraordinary manage-
ment developments, purchases or sale of substantial assets.
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an assessment of, its significance within the context of the relevant
facts and circumstances of a situation. 53 Thus, under this concept of
materiality, corporate political contributions in foreign countries, the
payment of bribes or fees to consultants, the use of slush funds and
other accounting machinations would not in themselves be material.
In recent years, the SEC has applied the concept of integrity dis-
closure to establish the materiality of questionable overseas activities
by American corporations and to force the disclosure of such ac-
tivities. The concept of integrity disclosure and the rationale for such
a theory developed from the views of SEC Commissioners, in their
personal capacities, and the recent decision in SEC v. Kalvex, Inc. 54
Former Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. 55 and Commissioners A.A.
Sommer, Jr.5 5 Philip A. Loomis, Jr., 57 and John R. Evans 5 " have
stated that activities which reflect on the quality of management or
earnings or on the integrity of corporate financial accounting and re-
porting are material." The Commissioners reasoned that the SEC has
" Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1972). For
an exhaustive compilation of facts which plaintiffs have claimed as material, see A.
JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 106-5 § 61.04(b) (1974).
" [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 95,226 at 98,184 (S.D.N.Y. July 7,
1975).
55 Address by Ray Garrett, Jr., former SEC Chairman, Homily on the Glories of
Right Conduct and the Wages of Sin, American Soc'y of Corporate Secretaries, Inc., June
27, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Garrett Homily Speech], reprinted in Hearings on the Ac-
tivities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad Before the Subcomm. on Intl Econ. Pol-
icy of the House Comm. on Intl Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 58-63 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings on Activities of Multinational Corps.]; Address by Ray
Garrett, Jr., Disclosures and Corporate Management, The Wharton Graduate Business
School Club of New York, Inc. and Harvard Business School Club of New York, Apr.
14, 1975 (hereinafter cited as Garrett Corporate Management Speech], on file at the of-
fices of the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review; Address by Ray Garrett,
Jr., The Uses of Disclosure, National Investor Relations Institute, Sept. 30, 1975
(hereinafter cited as Garrett Uses of Disclosure Speech], on file at the offices of the Boston
College Industrial and Commercial Law Review; Address by Ray Garrett, Jr., Is The SEC
Anti-Business?, Public Relations Soc'y of America (Wis. Chapter) and Milwaukee Bar
Ass'n, Sept. 12, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Garrett SEC Speech], on file at the officers.of
the Boston College. Industrial and Commercial Law Review; Address by Ray Garrett, Jr.,
Confidence In Business, 1975 Midwest Public Relations Conf., Sept. 12, 1975 [hereinafter
cited as Garrett Confidence Speech], on file at the offices of the Boston College Industrial
and Commercial Law Review.
"Address by A.A. Sommer, Jr., SEC Commissioner, Crisis and the Corporate Com-
munity, Midwest Securities Commissioners Ass'n Conf. July 21, 1975 [hereinafter cited
as Sommer Crisis Speech], on file at the offices of the Boston College Industrial and Com-
mercial Law Review; Address by A.A. Sommer, Jr., The Limits of Disclosure, Wharton
School, Univ. of Pa., June 24, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Sommer Disclosure-Speech], on
file at the offices of the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review.
" House Hearings on Activities of Multinational Corps., supra note 55, at 35-39,
57-67, 180-90 (Philip A. Loomis, SEC Commissioner).
58 Address by John R. Evans, SEC Commissioner, Truth or Consequences, Securities
Corporative Enforcement Conf., May 15, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Evans Truth
Speech], on file at the offices of the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review.
" Id. at 6-8; Garrett Homily Speech, supra note 55, at 21-24; Sommer Disclosure
Speech, supra note 56, at 3-8; House Hearings on Activities of Multinational Corps., supra
316
CORPORATE FOREIGN PAYMENTS
the duty to enforce the federal securities laws which are designed to
protect and inform the investor. In order to fulfill this duty, the SEC
must examine those foreign corporate activities that might reasonably
affect the decision of an investor to buy, sell, or hold a security, or af-
fect the decision of a shareholder in deciding how to cast his corpo-
rate vote." The Commissioners have determined that fictitious entries
in corporate books which conceal the true nature of the expenditures
and the utilization of slush funds are material facts." The materiality,
in the eyes of the Commissioners, turns not on the size of the pay-
ments in relation to the total expenses, sales, or earnings of the cor-
poration, but rather on the fact that the falsification of the corporate
accounts raises questions regarding the company's financial integrity."
Since a prospective investor, as well as a present stockholder, looks to
the financial records of a corporation for guidance in deciding what
action to take in respect to that company's stock, any impropriety af-
fecting the financial records, regardless of the size of the amount in-
volved, is material and must be disclosed."
Linked to the financial integrity of the corporation in maintain-
ing its corporate books is the integrity of the corporation's manage-
ment. The Commissioners concluded that disclosure that corporate
executives approved foreign payments and that corporate records
were falsified—even if the payments were proper 'under foreign
laws—would lead a reasonable investor to question the integrity of the
officials and their ability to properly discharge their corporate
duties."
note 55, at 36-37 (Statement of Philip A. Loomis). Their remarks have often been pref-
aced with declarations that the SEC is not designed to act as a corporate policeman
and that it is not the goal of the SEC to punish the multinational corporations even if
their flutist] payments are considered illegal or immoral. See, e.g., Sommer Crisis
Speech, supra note 56, at 8; Garrett Homily Speech, supra note 55, at II); House Hearings
on Activities of Multinational Corps., supra note 55, at 36 (Statement or Philip A. Lootnis,
SEC Commissioner); Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1975, at 2, col. 3. Sommer, in The Slippery
Slope of Materiality, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 16, 1975, at I, col. 2, and former Chairman Garrett
have warned against using disclosure standards to enforce social policy. Garrett Laments
SEC's Probable Radical Change in Traditional Materiality Disclosure Standards, BNA SEC.
REG. L. REP. No. 321 at A-20 (Oct. I, 1975).
"Sommer Crisis Speech, supra note 56; at 8; Garrett SEC Speech, supra note 55,
at 2. See also Address by Stanley Sporkin, Director, SEC Enforcement Division, National
Ass'n of Accountants, Oct. 15, 1975, at 2 [hereinafter cited as Sporkin Speech], on file
at the offices of the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review,
°' Sommer Disclosure Speech, supra note 56, at 8; Sporkin Speech, supra note 60,
at 2.
52 Sommer Disclosure Speech supra note 56, at 3-4; Evans Truth Speech, supra note
58, at 7.
"3 Garrett Homily Speech, supra note 55, at 60; Sunnite]. Disclosure Speech, .supra
note 56, at 7-9; Evans Truth Speech, supra note 58, at 7-8; House Hearings on Activities of
Multinational Corps., supra note 55, at 36 (Statement of Philip A. Loomis, SEC Commis- .
shiner); Sporkin Speech, supra note 60, at 6; Garrett Corporate Management Speech, supra
note 55, at 14-15; Garrett Uses of Disclosure Speech, supra note 55, at 9.10; Garrett
Confidence Speech, supra note 55, at 15; 'Garrett SEC Speech, supra note 55, at 2.
54 Sporkin Speech, supra note 60, at 2; 'Garrett SEC Speech, supra note 55, at 2;
Garrett Confidence Speech, supra note 55, at 18-19; Evans Truth Speech, supra note 58, at
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Since the investor's decisions regarding the stock and the election of
corporate officers might be affected, such facts are also material and
warrant disclosure.65
A final aspect of the foreign payments which the Commissioners
have emphasized as requiring disclosure is the potential impact such
payments may have on the "quality of earnings" of the company."
Such payments expose the company to economic risks, both in the
host country and in the United States. Modest initial payments may
lead to spiraling demands. If such future demands are not met or if
the payments are uncovered, the corporation may face reprisals in-
cluding loss of licenses or other government privileges, or even ex-
propriation of the company's interests." Nondisclosure of such
foreign payments also creates opportunities for corporate or indi-
vidual blackmail in the United States." These risks might lead to sub-
stantial losses or expenditures by the corporation. Consequently, a
corporation must disclose such payments so that an investor may fully
weigh the risks and benefits in making his investment decision."
Despite the strict approach inherent in the concept of integrity
disclosure, the Commissioners apparently left open one loophole. If
payments are properly recorded on the corporate books, are paid out
of normal corporate funds and are not of the type which jeopardize
the corporate earnings, such payments may not be material unless
65 Garrett Homily Speech, supra note 55, at 60; House Hearings on the Activities of
Multinational Corps., supra note 55, at 36 (Statement of Philip A. Loomis); Sporkin
Speech, supra note 60, at 2; Garrett Corporate Management Speech, supra note 55, at 15;
Garrett SEC Speech, supra note 55, at 2. The failure to disclose extensive use of corpo-
rate funds for personal purposes and other questionable conduct was held material in
Franchard Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4710 (July 31, 1964), [1964-1966
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 77,113, at 82,038 (stop order proceeding to
suspend effectiveness of registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933 §§
8(c), (d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h(c), (d) (1970).
Present SEC requirements embody a limited degree of competence and integrity
disclosure going to the quality of management. See Form S-I, Item I6(d) ("What is re-
quired is information relating to the level of his professional competence ....), Item
I6(e) (disclosure of certain events which occurred during the past 10 years and "which
are material to an evaluation of the ability and integrity of any director or executive of-
ficer of the registrant ....), 2 CCH FED, SEC. L. REP.18,195. See also Form 10-K, Item
2(c), 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 131,104 at 22,061 and Schedule I3D, Item 2.2 CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP.123,685 at 17, 241.
°° Garrett Homily Speech, supra note 55, at 60; Garrett Confidence Speech, supra
note 55, at 14-15; Garrett Uses of Disclosure Speech, supra note 55, at 10.
" Garrett Confidence Speech, supra note 55, at 15; Sommer Disclosure Speech,
supra note 56, at 10.
°° Evans Muth Speech, supra note 58, at 8.
"Garrett Homily Speech, supra note 55, at 60-61; Sommer Disclosure Speech,
supra note 56, at 10-11; Evans Truth Speech, supra note 58, at 7-8; Garrett Corporate
Management Speech, supra note 55, at 14-15; Garrett SEC Speech, supra note 55, at 2. In
a newspaper interview, Roderick M. Hills, SEC Chairman, indicated that he believes the
significant factor in determining materiality, and hence the necessity of disclosure, is
the amount of business potentially affected by a payoff rather than the size of the bribe
itself. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1975, at 57, col. 8. The quality of earnings test apparently
satisfies both the "reasonable investor" and the "market impact" test of materiality.
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they are of substantial size in proportion to the total earnings of the
company."
Whether the courts will accept the concept of integrity disclosure
proposed by the Commissioners remains uncertain. 7 ' In SEC v.
Kalvex, Inc.,' 2 the federal district court adopted the concept of integ-
rity disclosure, albeit in a somewhat different factual situation than
that of a transnational bribe. In this action, the SEC charged the de-
fendants Kalvex, Emanuel L. Wolfe (Chairman of the Board of Kal-
vex), and Robert L. Ingis (a director and Executive Vice-President of
Kalvex) with violating sections 13(a) and 14(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. 73 The SEC alleged that the annual and periodic
reports and the proxy materials of Kalvex failed to disclose the par-
ticipation of Ingis and Wolfe in a scheme in which a dummy corpora-
tion was used to transmit kickbacks of approximately $8,500 from a
company supplier to the defendant Wolfe. 74
 The SEC further as-
" Successful utilization of the loophole is unlikely. A study of corporate involve-
ment in illegal, improper, or questionable payments conducted by the Investor Respon-
sibility Research Center (I RRC) in Washington D.C. has indicated that most companies
failing to disclose foreign payments also appear to have falsified corporate books and
records. The Wall Street Journal quotes the IRRC as saying, "Every one of the com-
panies that has admitted illegal contributions or bribes to foreign officials also has con-
ceded that those transactions weren't recorded accurately on corporate books, or to
shareholders." Elia, Large Investors Are Increasingly Contented About Corporate 'Watergates,'
Study says, Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1975, at 47, col. 3.
"Compare Rata! v. Geneen, (1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FEE). SEE. L. RED
1 93,505, at 92,441 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (failure to•disclose in proxy materials that certain
directors were defendants in actions alleging transactions which violated 1 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of '1934 held material), Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 336 F.
Supp. 655, 658 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (failure to disclose in proxy materials that former direc-
tors who had proposed a refinancing plan were currently defendants in numerous ac-
tions alleging fraud against the company and breach of fiduciary obligations, and fail-
ure to reveal the connection between two of the candidates for re-election and several
of those former directors held material), Beatty v. Bright, 318 F. Supp. 169, 173 (S.D.
Iowa 1970) (failure to• disclose in proxy materials that directors were defendants in
numerous actions alleging self-dealing against the corporation held material), and
Cooke v. Teleprompter Corp., 334 F. Stipp. 467, 472 (S.D.N.Y, 1971) (failure to dis-
close a bribery conviction of a director standing for re-election held material, with
Seibert v. Abbott, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 9 93,939, at 93,742
(pending litigation not involving self-dealing or fraud against the company or violations
of law bearing on the integrity of the candidates for election held immaterial, save for
one claim alleging insider trading) and Ash v. Baker, 392 F. Supp. 368, 372 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (pending litigation before United States Supreme Court alleging that corporate
officers and directors used corporate funds for political advertising and otherwise ex-
pended corporate funds in violation of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 18 U.S.C. 1
610, held immaterial). See also requirements of Form S-1, Item 12, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 1 8,175; Form 10-K, Item 5, 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.I31,103 at 22,057-58.
"[Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REN195,226, at 98,184 (S.D.N.Y. July 7,
1975).
73 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a), 78n(a) (1970). [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP.195,226 at 98,184.
"[Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. Rct.1 95,226 at 98,186. See SEC v. TuA
Ind., 75 Civil 4519 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 16, 1975), where the SEC moved for the appoint-
ment of a receiver for two corporations and the removal of their top executives. alleg-
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serted that the corporation failed to disclose that corporate funds
were used to reimburse Ingis during 1971-1973 for $1,000 per year
in personal expenses unrelated to corporate purposes. 75
Noting that the purpose of the reports required by the Securities
Exchange Act is to insure that investors periodically receive adequate
information regarding the operation and financial condition of corpo-
rations, the court held the annual and periodic reports filed by Kalvex
to be materially false and misleading in that they "failed to accurately
present the accounts of Kalvex and falsely stated the income and ex-
penses of Kalvex."7 6 The court based its finding on the failure of the
reports to disclose (1) that Ingis received improper reimbursements by
causing false entries to be made in corporate books and (2) that the
dummy corporation under Ingis' control had received the $8,500 in
kickbacks from the Kalvex supplier. 77
The court also accepted the SEC's contention that the proxy
statements issued by Kalvex were materially false and misleading even
though the elections of directors for which the proxy statements in
question were distributed were not contested. 78 The court stated
that "these elections were no less important to the stockholders of
Kalvex than they would have been were a proxy contest on the hori-
zon, particularly where the undisclosed facts might have led a reason-
able stockholder to question the integrity of Ingis and his ability to discharge
his fiduciary obligations." 79 The materiality test, the court continued,
turned on whether the vote of any of the stockholders of the corpo-
rate defendant would have been influenced by the full disclosure of
an individual defendant's activities, because shareholders would not be
expected to elect as a director an individual who had used the corpo-
ration for personal gain."
ing that they had participated in a kickback scheme involving finder's fees and in the
fraudulent sale and purchase of stock. N.Y. LE Sept. 17, 1975, at I, col. 3.
" [Current Binder] CCH Fen. SEC. L. REP:1,95,226, at 98,185.
79 Id. at 98,188.
" Id.
"Id. at 98,187.
79 Id. (emphasis added).
"Id. The court relied on J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), Mills v. Elec.
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), and General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403
F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968). After establishing the materiality of the undisclosed facts
under §§ 13(a) and 14(a), the Court found Ingis guilty of violating, and of aiding and
abetting the violation of, these provisions of the Exchange Act. It thus granted the SEC
motion for summary judgment and denied Ingis' cross-motion for summary judgment.
[Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 1 95,226, at 98,189. Co-defendants Wolf and
Kalvex consented to the entry of judgment against them without admitting or denying
the SEC allegations. Id. at 98,185. Therefore, Ingis became the only active party. Since
§ 13(a) of the Exchange Act applies only to the issuer (Kalvex), Ingis could only be held
as an aider and abettor of Kalvex' violation of 13(a). Memorandum of Law in Support
of the Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment Against the Defendant Robert L.
Ingis, at 15 n.7, SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 195,226,
at 98,184 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1975). Following the Kalvex decision, the SEC barred Ingis
from appearing or practicing before it as an accountant unless employed or supervised
by another accountant. Wall &J., Dec. 15, 1973, at 8, col. 2.
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Of particular concern in the development of the concept of in-
tegrity disclosure is the court's denial of defendant Ingis' cross-motion
for summary judgment. Ingis asserted that a genuine issue of fact did
exist as to the materiality of the $8,500 involved in the kickback ar-
rangement and the $1,000 per year expense money."' He argued that
the size of the amounts involved, in comparison to aggregate cor-
porate expenses and per share earnings for the periods in question,
rendered the payments immaterial.'" The SEC maintained that the
relative size of the amounts did not constitute the controlling factor in
determining materiality, as it was the "failure to disclose the receipt of
improper reimbursements by a director and officer of a public com-
pany which caused the statement of expenses in the company's re-
ports to be false and misleading in light of the circumstances in which
they were made."" The court agreed with the SEC.
While Kalvex is not completely analogous to the factual situations
arising in the case of nondisclosure of foreign activities by American
multinational corporations, similarities do exist which suggest possible
judicial acceptance of the integrity disclosure concepts in the transna-
tional payments context. The Kalvex decision suggests that the falsifi-
cation of corporate books to conceal the true purpose of the overseas
payments will be held material under the integrity disclosure concept
regardless of the size of a payment. Thus, reporting corporations and
officials who falsify corporate records in order to make overseas pay-
ments would violate sections 13(a) and I4(a) of the Exchange Act, and
Rule 14a-9. 84 The failure to disclose the participation or even tacit
approval of corporate officials in accumulating funds outside the
normal accounting channels might also be material under the integrity
disclosure concept, thus creating liability under sections 13(a) and
" Memorandum of Law In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion For Summary
Judgment and In Support of Defendant's Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment at 6,
SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 95,226, at 98,184
(S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Ingis Memo For Summary Judgment].
" Affidavit In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment and In
Support of Defendant's Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment, Feb. 10, 1975, at 6-10,
SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 95,226, at 98,184
(S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Affidavit in Opposition].
" Reply Brief For Plaintiff at 13-14, SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., [Current Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 95,266, at 98,184 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Reply
Brief For Plaintiff]. The SEC declared "the fact that Ingis' improper expense reim-
bursements were 'small' is irrelevant. Ingis was a director and officei of Kalvex and was
placed in a position of trust; that he abused this trust and failed to disclose this breach
of trust is not disputed." Id. at 10. Relying on Sonesta Int'l Hotel Corp. v. Wellington Assoc.,
483 F.2d 247, 252 (2d Cir. 1973) and Mills v. Electric Auto-bite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384
(1970), the SEC advocated as the test for determining materiality whether a shareholder
"might have been" influenced by the information. Reply Brief For Plaintiff, supra, at
15-16. See also Rafal v. Geneen, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCI4 FED. SEC. L. REP.
11 93,505, at 93,441 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 336 F. Supp. 655, 657
(ED. Pa. 1971); Beatty v. Bright, 318 F. Supp.' 169, 173 (S.D. Iowa 1970).
84 See Kalvex, [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 95,226, at 98,188. Such
conduct probably would also be defined as material for Rule 106,5 purposes.
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I4(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and under Rule 10b-5."
The factual situation in Kalvex may, however, be distinguishable
in one respect from the foreign activities of multinational corpora-
tions. The court in Kalvex emphasized the fact that the individual de-
fendant had used the corporation for personal gain," whereas multi-
national corporations and their officers and directors may claim that
the foreign payments promoted the interest of the corporation. Based
on developments in the Kalvex case, however, it appears that the SEC
would reject this defense. In Kalvex, the defendant argued that he was
not liable for securities violations since he did not personally benefit
from the kickback scheme." In reply to this argument, the SEC relied
on the Second Circuit's statements in SEC v. North American Research
and Development Corp." that the defendant's failure to benefit person-
ally from an illegal scheme does not preclude an SEC action for in-
junctive relief since "the absence of economic motivation is no defense
to an action by the SEC to enjoin conduct the continuation of which
would lead to improvident decisions by the investing and speculating
public on the basis of misleading or incomplete information."" It ap-
pears that the court adopted the reasoning of the SEC."" Where self-
dealing is not involved, however, other courts have imposed a more
lenient standard regarding disclosure."'
Armed with the disclosure provisions of the securities laws, sup-
plemented by the concept of integrity disclosure, the SEC has recently
investigated the overseas activities of several American corporations.
These investigations have culminated in the SEC's filing complaints
against Gulf Oil Corporation, Phillips Petroleum Co., Northrop Cor-
poration, Ashland Oil, Inc., and United Brands Co." The SEC com-
plaints alleged that these companies violated sections I3(a) and 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934" and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1,
and 14a-9 promulgated thereunder"' by filing false and misleading
reports and proxy statements which failed to state material facts."
93 See id. at 98,187.
88 Id.
87 Affidavit in Opposition, supra note 82, at 3.
" 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970).
424 F.2d at 82. Reply Brief For Plaintiff, supra note 83, at 9.
99 [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. at 91,188.
91 E.g., Siebert v. Abbott, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,939
at 93,742 (ED. Pa. 1973).
"SEC v. Gulf Oil Corp., Civ. Action No. 75-0324 (D.D.C., filed Mar. 11,1975);
SEC v. Phillips Petroleum Co., Civ. Action No. 75-0308(D.D.C., filed Mar. 6, 1975);
SEC v. Ashland Oil, Inc., Civ. Action No. 75-0794 (D.D.C., filed May 16, 1975); SEC v.
United Brands Co., Civ. Action No. 75-0509 (D.D.C., filed Apr. 9, 1975); SEC v.
Northrop Corp., Civ. Action No. 75-0563 (D.D.C., filed Apr. 16, 1975).
"3 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78n(a) (1970).
04 17 C.F.R. §§ 290.126-20, 290.13a-1, 240.14a-9 (1975).
" The complaint filed against United Brands omitted allegations of violations
under § I4(a), but alleged violations of 10(b), 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1970) and Rules
106-5, 13a-1 I, 13a-I3, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.13a-11, 13a- 13 (1975). The com-
plaint charged that, in a letter to shareholders and reports to the SEC, the company re-
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The SEC asserted that the corporations had failed to disclose the fol-
lowing material actions: (1) the maintenance and utilization of secret
funds of corporate monies for unlawful political contributions and
other purposes," (2) the charging as expenses and costs on corporate
books or those of subsidiaries of substantial sums of monies, ostensibly
for business purposes, but in fact for the systematic diversion of funds
for unlawful uses," (3) the making of agreements with various consul-
tants, agents, or other legal representatives, under which substantial
sums were or would be disbursed to them without adequate account-
ing or auditing procedures to ensure that such payments were actually
made for business purposes or that the services provided were com-
mensurate with the amounts paid, 98 (4) the filing with the Commis-
sion of financial statements which did not accurately represent the
accounts of the corporations with regard to the income, expenses, and
assets of the corporations," and (5) the failure to identify and state
the extent of involvement of any director, officer, or employee in the
ferred to an agreement with the government of Honduras, but failed to divulge all
material terms of the agreement, including that the company had agreed to pay $2.5
million to government officials. United Brands Complaint, supra note 92, at 2-5.
96 Ashland Complaint, supra note 92, at 3; Phillips Complaint, supra note 92, at 3;
Northrop Complaint, supra, note 92, at 3; United Brands Complaint, supra note 92, at 3;
Gulf Complaint, supra note 92, at 3. Specifically, the SEC charged that United Brands
had paid $750,000 to European governmental officials since 1970. United Brands
Complaint, supra note 92, at 4.
" 7 Ashland Complaint, supra note 92, at 3-4; Phillips Complaint, supra note 92, at
3; Northrop Complaint, supra note 92, at 3; United Brands Complaint, supra note 92, at
3; Gulf Complaint, supra note 92, at 3. The complaints against Ashland, Phillips, North-
rop and Gulf also charged that the failure to disclose such activities, payments, and
false bookkeeping violated the Securities Exchange Act, §§ 13(a), 14(a). Ashland Com-
plaint, supra note 92, at 5-6; Phillips Complaint, supra note 92, at 4-5; Northrop Com-
plaint, supra note 92, at 4-5; Gulf Complaint, supra note 92, at 4. Specifically, the Ash-
land Complaint alleged the diversion of $779,997 to a secret fund since 1967. Ashland
Complaint, supra note 92, at 4. The SEC accused Phillips of disbursing more than $2.8
million since 1963 to two Swiss corporations by means of false entries in corporate
books and records. Phillips Complaint, supra note 92, at 3. Gulf was charged with dis-
bursing over $10 million since 1960 to a Bahamian subsidiary and others by means of
false entries in records; then returning $5.4 million to the U.S. in cash and distributing
the balance in cash overseas. Gulf Complaint, supra note 92, at 3.
" Ashland Complaint, supra note 92, at 4; Northrop Complaint, supra note 92, at
3-4. Specifically, Ashland was charged with the transfer or disbursement of over $4
million in cash overseas pursuant to contractual or other agreements with various con-
sultants, legal representatives, and others. Ashland Complaint, supra note 92, at 4. The
Northrop complaint charged that corporation with disbursing in excess of $1,100,000 to
one foreign consultant since 1961, and with disbursing or agreeing to disburse $30 mil-
lion to various consultants, agents, or others during 1971-73. Northrop Complaint,
supra note 92, at 3-4.
" Ashland Complaint, supra note 92, at 5; Phillips Complaint, supra note 92, at 4.
Northrop Complaint omits the allegation of filing false financial statements, but charges
the filing of annual reports which did not accurately present the accounts and falsely
stated the income and expenses of Northrop. Northrop Complaint, supra note 92, at 4.
While the United Brands Complaint alleges the filing of false and misleading annual
and periodic reports, it does not specifically allege that these reports falsely stated the
income, expenses, and assets of the corporations. United Brands Complaint, supra note
92, at 4-5.
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use of corporate funds for unlawful purposes.'°° No opinions were
rendered in the actions against Gulf, Northrop, Ashland, Phillips and
United Brands. These corporations and the officials involved con-
sented to the entry of final judgments and permanent injunctions
against future violations.'°'
By consenting to an entry of final judgment and permanent in-
junction, the corporations avoided further litigation without admitting
or denying guilt. 102
 The permanent injunction obtained against each
corporation prohibited future violations of sections 13(a) and 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9, including specifically the
use of funds for unlawful political contributions or similar unlawful
purposes and the failure to disclose (1) the nature and extent of any
expenditure of corporate funds for unlawful political contributions or
other unlawful purpose, (2) the nature and extent of false or fictitious
accounting entries, or (3) the establishment or maintenance of funds
or assets which have not been fully and properly recorded. 103 In addi-
tion, the SEC secured ancillary relief in the form of an "undertaking"
incorporated into the final judgment to supplement the injunction.'"
This ancillary relief included the appointment of a special master to
inquire into and examine the books and records of the corporation, to
render a proper accounting, and to submit a report to the court and
the corporation's shareholders regarding the matters set forth in the
complaint.'" The undertaking in the Ashland proceeding, for in-
100 Gulf Complaint, supra note 92, at 3-4; Ashland Complaint, supra note 92, at
5-6; Phillips Complaint, supra note 92, at 4-5; Northrop Complaint, supra note 92, at 5.
'°' Final Judgment and Order of Permanent Injunction Against Ashland Oil,
Inc., Civ. Action No. 75-0794 (D.D.C., filed May 16, 1975); Final Judgment of Perma-
nent Injunction Against Gulf Oil Corp., Civ. Action No. 75-0324 (D.D.C., filed March
I I, 1975); Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction Against Northrop Corp., Civ. Ac-
tion No. 75-0563 (D.D.C., filed Apr. 16, 1975); Final Judgment of Permanent Injunc-
tion Against Phillips Petroleum Co., Civ. Action No. 75-0308 (D.D.C., filed Mar. 6,
1975). The SEC suit against United Brands was recently settled. SEC v. United Brands
Co., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 95,420, at 99,139 (D.D.C. 1976).
While Gulf consented to the entry of final judgment, Claude C. Wild, Jr., Gulfs
former vice president in Washington is fighting the SEC charges. Wall St. J., Dec. 12,
1975, at 5, col. I; N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1975, at 35, col. 7; Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1975, at
3, col. 2.
' 02 Ashland Final Judgment, supra note 101, at I; Gulf Final Judgment, supra
note 101, at I; Phillips Final judgment, supra note 101, at I; Northrop Final judgment,
supra note 101, at I. See 3 L. Loss. SECURITIES REGULATION 1982-83 (2d ed. 1961).
2 °3 Ashland Final Judgment, supra note 101, at 1-5; Gulf Final Judgment, supra
note 101, at 1-4; Phillips Final Judgment, supra note 101, at 1-4; Northrop Final Judg-
ment, supra note 101, at 1-5. The final judgment against United Brands ban the com-
pany from future anti-fraud violations in connection with foreign payments. The cor-
poration must also make full disclosure of any future "unlawful" payments, as specified,
of corporate funds. SEC v. United Brands Co. [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
1 95,420, at 99,139-40 (D.D.C: 1976).
104 Ashland Final Judgment, supra note 101, at I; Northrop Final Judgment,
supra note 101, at 1; Phillips Final Judgment, supra note 101, at I; Gulf Final Judgment,
supra note 101, at I.
I" See SEC v. United Brands Co., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
1 95,420, at 99,141-43 (D.D.C. 1976).
329
CORPORATE FOREIGN PAYMENTS
stance, required a Special Committee to complete an investigation
within 90 days after the entry of final judgment and submit a written
report to Ashland's Board of Directors who in turn must take the
necessary action to implement the report's recommendations 106 It
also required that the report be filed as an exhibit to SEC Form 8-K
not later than the month following that in which it would be submit-
ted to the Board of Directors."'
These examples demonstrate that the overseas activities of
American corporations may, in some cases, be effectively regulated by
the SEC's enforcement of the disclosure provisions of the securities
laws. In enforcing these provisions, however, the SEC must be sensi-
tive to the potential harm which may result from full disclosure of all
overseas activities. Full disclosure may open a Pandora's box plaguing
not only the specific corporation involved, but ultimately the competi-
tive position of virtually all American corporations with subsidiaries in
foreign countries. The SEC must attempt to establish a means of dis-
closure that will inform investors of the facts they need to know and
yet avoid the sometimes drastic consequences that may result if dis-
closure of every detail of every payment made overseas is required.
The SEC must devise procedures to deal specifically with two prob-
lems: (I) handling current disclosures by companies which have made
undisclosed overseas payments in the past, and (2) establishing
"" Undertaking of Ashland Oil, Inc., SEC v. Ashland Oil, Inc., Civil Action No.
75-0794 at 1-3 (D.D.C., filed May 16, 1975). The Special Committee's report did not
disclose the names of the recipients of Ashland's payments. I REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMFETEF. TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ASHLAND OIL INC. 1 21-29 (June 26, 1975).
However, the SEC demanded that Ashland disclose these names, and the company ac-
ceded to the demand. N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1975, la, at 1, col. 3. The Special
Committee's report contains recommendations regarding the corporation's policy with
respect to future political contributions. ASHLAND REPORT. supra, at 180-83. Future
payments of an illegal nature by the law of the jurisdiction in which the transactions
occur should be clearly opposed by the company. Id. at 184. Payments to consultants
involving contracts or agreements above a specified amount or for longer than one year
should require the approval of two to three specified corporate executives and an attes-
tation by the consultant, at the time of the formalization of the contract or agreement
and annually thereafter, that he "has not and will not make payments to third parties
which the consultant knows or has reason to know are illegal in the jurisdiction in
which the transaction takes place." Id. at 184-86. The Committee also asserted the com-
pany should adopt a policy prohibiting undisclosed or improperly recorded expendi-
tures. M. at 188-89. For Ashland Board resolutions declaring corporate policy against
contributions of corporate funds or other assets, whether legal or illegal, to public
office-holders or candidates for public office, see II REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ASHLAND OIL, INC., Exhibit R-2 (June 26, 1975), "reaf-
firming" corporate policy against illegal payments, whether directly or indirectly from
corporate funds, see id. Exhibit R-3; and declaring corporate policy against the mainte-
nance of undisclosed corporate funds, see id. Exhibit R-4. For an analysis of the report
of the Special Review Committee formed as a result of the settlement of the SEC's suit
against the Gulf Oil Corporations, see Smith, 'Illegality' Cited in Gulf Payments, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 31, 1975, at I, col. I; Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1976, at 5, col. 2. The report ap-
parently played a critical role in the ouster by the board of directors of Bob R. Dorsey
as chairman of Gulf. Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
Undertaking of Ashland Oil, Inc., supra note 106, at 3.
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workable guidelines to adequately explain what conduct will constitute
violations of the securities laws in the future. The SEC's present dis-
closure policy does not adequately take into account these two prob-
lems.
In view of the consequences following disclosures by the com-
panies formally charged by the SEC, most companies have been reluc-
tant to come forward in the absence of some sort of definite
guidelines. Realizing this, the SEC has adopted an amnesty arrange-
ment. A corporation which believes it may have violated the federal
securities laws by failing to disclose past foreign payments may: (I)
notify the SEC of its suspicions; (2) conduct a thorough investigation
under the direction of independent auditors or outside directors to ob-
tain all information concerning the company's activities; (3) inform
the SEC of the results of the investigation and if violations have been
uncovered, suggest what disclosure the company believes is appro-
priate; and (4) take steps to stop all such payments and adopt policies
prohibiting such conduct in the future.'° 8 Companies following the
SEC suggestions would apparently be spared the embarrassment of
having the SEC file an enforcement action against them.'" Also, the
SEC has implied that such volunteers would only be subject to limited
disclosure, thereby avoiding possible serious damage to their foreign
interests."°
Corporate reaction to the SEC recommendations has thus far
been less than enthusiastic. Only recently has there been any appreci-
able response to the offer, announced in July, 1975, of amnesty in ex-
change for voluntary revelation of questionable payments overseas."'
This lack of enthusiasm is probably due to the fact that the SEC has
not guaranteed that compliance with the suggested procedures will
definitely preclude future enforcement actions against a firm or that in
'°° SEC Offers Amnesty In Corporate Payoffs, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 4, 1975, at 20; Wall
St. J., Sept. 9, 1975, at I, col. 6; Hearings on the Activities of American Multinational Corpo-
rations Abroad Before the Subcomm. on Int'( Econ. Policy of the House Comm. on Int? Relations,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 63-64, 66 (1975) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on Activities of
Multinational Corps!] (statement of Philip A. Loomis, SEC Commissioner).
109 Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
110 Address Ray Garrett, Jr., former SEC Chairman, Confidence in Business, 1975
Midwest Public Relations Conf., Sept. 12, 1975 at 15-16 [hereinafter cited as Garrett
Confidence Speech], on file at the offices of the Boston College Industrial and Commercial
Law Review. '
"' Firms which apparently have Followed the SEC's suggestion include Cities
Serv. Co. (Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1975, at 6, col. 2); Castle & Cooke, Inc. (Wall St. J., Nov.
25, 1975, at•7, col. I); Exxon Corp. (Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1975, at I, col. 6); American
Home hikeCorp. (N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1975, at 39, col. 1); Rockwell Int. Corp. (Wall
St. J., Jan. 2, 1976, at 5, col. r; N.Y. Times, Jan. I, 1976, at 23, col. 6); G.D. Searle &
Co. (Wall St. J., Jan. 12, 1976, at 2, col. 2; Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1976, at 2, col. 5);
A-T-O, Inc. (Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1976, at 4, col. 3); Tenneco, Inc. (N.Y. Times, Feb. 15,
1976; I, at I, col. 6; Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1976, at 2, col. 3); Santa Fe Int'l Corp. (Wall
St. j., Feb. 17, 1976, at 3, col. 2);-Baxter Laboratories, Inc. (N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1976,
at 49, col. 1; Wall St. J., Feb. 24; 1976, at 4, col. 2); and Levi Strauss & Co. (Wall St. J.,
Feb. 24, 1976, at 4. col. 3).
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all cases limited disclosure will be sufficient.'" Another consideration
is that leniency on the part of the SEC does not forestall the possibil-
ity of shareholders' suits alleging nondisclosures. 13 These factors sug-
gest that the SEC amnesty arrangement will not be an adequate solu-
tion to the foreign activities problem.
Several courses of action exist for the SEC. The Commission
could develop a theory based on more traditional concepts of material-
ity and distinguish payments on the basis of size or custom. Small
payments are immaterial because of the slight chance for economic
reprisal by the foreign government or even by the particular official
involved. Thus such payments, if "small" in size, made in accordance
with locally accepted practices, properly recorded on the corporate
books, and paid from authorized funds, would be deemed immaterial,
thereby obviating the need for disclosure. Former Chairman Garrett
espoused the view that the "small" bribes, so called "mordidas,"
should not be deemed material. Mordidas—e.g.; payments to the local
postman to obtain regular mail service, to a fire inspector, customs in-
spector or tax collector—are commonplace and are rarely regarded as
improper by many host countries."' Garrett indicated that neither he
nor any of the other Commissioners believed that these "small" pay-
ments were anything "to get excited about" as long as such payments
follow local custom and usage.'" This approach, however, raises the
problem of devising a standard of quantitative materiality. Other dif-
ficulties arise if the activity in which the corporation has engaged is il-
legal under the laws of the host country, but is generally not prose-
cuted or is routinely "winked at;" for example, the filing of a false tax
statement. These problems undermine the utility of this approach.
Another approach would be to distinguish different types of
payments in delineating a concept of materiality. Payments made to
speed the performance of a duty which the recipient is already bound
to perform would not be matters for disclosure, while those aiming to
induce illegal behavior or conduct other than in the best interests of
the host country would be subject to disclosure. Suggested by former
Chairman Garrett,'" this approach apparently did not receive serious
" 2 Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1975, at I, col. 6. Apparently, however, the steps taken by
G.D. Searle & Co. will avoid a SEC enforcement action. Wall St. J., Jan. 12, 1976, at 2,
col. 2.
13 SEC Offers Amnesty in Corporate Payoffs, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 4, 1975, at 21.
"" Griffith, Payoff Is Not "Accepted Practice," FORTUNE, Aug. 1975, at 122, 125.
"3 Address by Ray Garrett, Jr., Former SEC Chairman, Homily on the Glories of
Right Conduct and the Wages of Sin, American Soc'y of Corp. Secretaries, Inc. June 27,
1975 [hereinafter cited as Garrett Homily Speech] reprinted in House Hearings on Activities
of Multinational Corps., supra note 108, at 61. Accord, Address by Stanley Sporkin, Direc-
tor, SEC Enforcement Division, National Ass'n of Accountants, Oct. 15, 1975, at 6, on
file at the offices of the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review. Contra,
Address by John R. Evans, SEC Commissioner, Truth or Consequences, Securities Cor-
porative Enforcement Conf., May 15, 1975, at 10-11, on file at the offices of the Boston
College Industrial and Commercial Law Review.
"° Garrett Homily Speech, supra note 115, at 62. See also Wall St. J., May 9, 1975,
at I, col. 1.
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consideration by , the other Commissioners.
The most desirable approach, it is submitted, is based on an ac-
ceptance of the concept of integrity disclosure as a standard of mate-
riality, and involves the requirement of only limited disclosure of
foreign activities. Commissioner Sommer has recommended that a
corporation be required to: (1) disclose it is making foreign payments;
(2) indicate what portion of the earnings of the business depended on,
or were jeopardized by, the payments; and (3) describe what effects
the disclosure or discontinuance of the payments would have on the
business."' Such details as the names of the recipient and the coun-
tries where the payments were made could be omitted, however, if the
companies specified that disclosure of these details would adversely
affect the business overseas."' The rationale for limited disclosure is
" 7 Addreis by A.A. Sommer, Jr., SEC Commissioner, The Limits of Disclosure,
Wharton School Univ. of Pa., June 24, 1975, at 17 [hereinafter cited as Sommer
Disclosure Speech], on file at the offices of the Boston College Industrial and Commercial
Law Review; Address by A.A. Sommer, Jr., SEC Commissioner, Crisis & The Corporate
Community, Midwest Securities Commissioners Ass'n Conf., July 21, 1975, at 10
[hereinafter cited as Sommer Crisis Speech], on file at the offices of the Boston College
Industrial and Commercial Law Review.
"I Sommer Crisis Speech, supra note 117, at 10; Sommer Disclosure Speech, supra
note 117, at 17. See statement of John Burton, SEC chief accountant, in To Tell or Not
To Tell, FORBES, Feb. I, 1976, at 41, 43. A recent prospectus filed by Cities Service
Company utilized this limited disclosure concept by disclosing a $30,000 expenditure in
a foreign country for political purposes, a $15,000 payment to a lobbyist in the country
where a subsidiary is located, and the existence of a $600,000 cash fund of an overseas
subsidiary, while withholding the names of the recipients and the countries involved.
CITIES SERVICE CO., PROSPECTUS 27-28 (Sept. 30, 1975). For a copy of the SEC Form 8-K
filed on Sept. 23, 1975 by Cities Service Co., see House Hearings on Activities of Multina-
tional Corps., supra note 108, at 182-85. The $600,000 Fund has now been terminated.
See also CITIES SERV. CO.. Form 8-K Current Report to SEC 1-3 (Sept. 23, 1975), on file
at the offices of the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review. Interestingly,
both the Prospectus and the Form 8-K of the Cities Service Co. contain the statement
that "[n]one of the foreign operations or subsidiaries in which any of the above-
described activities have been discovered to date are material in relation to the
Company's operation as a whole." /d. at 3 (emphasis added); Cities Service CO.,
PROSPECTUS 28 (Sept. 30, 1975).
A similar declaration is contained in a prospectus issued by Exxon Corporation.
After disclosing: (1) $740,000 in payments to various foreign officials between 1963-75;
(2) two foreign political contributions totaling $31,000 in 1972 that were improperly
booked; and (3) payments of $13,000 per year between 1969-75, now terminated, to a
government legislator for consultant service. Exxon states the above payments are not
material in view of the corporation's total operations and the steps taken by Exxon
management to prevent recurrences of this type of activity. EXXON CORP., PRELIMINARY
PROSPECTUS, EXXON PIPELINE CO. 31-32 (Sept. 30, 1975).
Merck & Co. has disclosed foreign payments of approximately $3.9 million in 36
foreign countries between 1968-75. The company states that except for one $12,500
payment to a cabinet-level official, these payments were to middle and lower echelon
officials. Merck & Co., Form 8-K Current Report to SEC 1-2 (Dec. 17, 1975). In its
Form 8-K, Merck declares that the "management of the Company is of the opinion that
any such payments that have been made in the past have not been, individually or in
the aggregate, material to, and that the termination of such payments will have no ma-
terial adverse effect upon, the Company's business, financial position or results of oper-
ations considered as a whole." Id. at 3. Merck has also withheld the names of the reci-
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that disclosure of the names of the recipients or the countries where
payments were made might jeopardize the future business prospects
of a corporation in that nation.'" This rationale is sound: full dis-
closure of all details surrounding foreign payments would undoubt-
edly be economically counterproductive. In addition, governmental re-
lations with nations friendly to the United States may also be damaged
as a result of freely disclosing American payments abroad.'2°
It does not appear, however, that the SEC is willing to accept this
approach of limited disclosure other than in the context of the am-
nesty program. The SEC has recently forced Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
to disclose to the SEC the identities of its foreign payoff recipients,'"
despite Lockheed's contention that disclosure of specifics regarding its
foreign payments could jeopardize present and future contracts and
adversely affect American foreign policy.122 The SEC originally sub-
poenaed certain documents from Lockheed which included the iden-
tities of foreign recipients.'" Lockheed, fearing that the information
might become public under the Freedom of Information Act,'" re-
fused to honor the subpoena.'22 The SEC then sought a court order
pients and countries involved, although the SEC has requested such information. Id. at
4. See also Wall St. J., Sept. 15, 1975, at 2, col. 3; Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1975, at 10, col. 3.
"° See, e.g., Wall St J., July 30, 1975, at 4, col. 2; Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1975, at 6,
col. 2. Merck & Co. has stated that it is withholding names of recipients "out of concern
for the safety and well-being of the individuals concerned ...." Merck & Co., Form
8-K Current Report to SEC 4 (Dec. 17, 1975).
120 In the action by the SEC against Lockheed to compel testimony and the pro-
duction of documents, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a suggestion of interest of
the United States at the request of the U.S. Secretary of State. The State Department
noted that "premature disclosure to third parties of certain of the names and
nationalities of foreign officials at this preliminary stage of the proceedings in the pres-
ent case would cause damage to United States foreign relations." SEC v. Lockheed Air-
craft Corp., [Current Binder] CCH Fut SEG L. REP.195,375, at 96,871 (D.D.C. 1975).
See N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1975, 1, at 23, col. I. United States relations with its allies
may be jeopardized by disclosures casting doubt on the integrity of high foreign offi-
cials. Crittenden, Closing In On Corporate Payoff's Overseas, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1976, I} 3,
at 1, col. 1. For reactions by foreign governments in which payments were made, espe-
cially Japan and the Netherlands, see The Global Costs of Bribery, Bus. WEEK, March 15,
1976, at 22-24.
12' The SEC requested the information in order to prepare a possible case
against Lockheed charging the firm with violations of the federal securities laws. Wall
St J., July 30, 1975, at 4, col. 2; Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1975, at 6, col. 2. The requested
documents concern $22 million which Lockheed has admitted paying to foreign officials
and political organizations since 1970. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1975, at I, col. 3; Wall St. J.,
Aug. 4, 1975, at 2, col. 2.
"± Hearings on Lockheed Bribery Before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, 29 (1975) (Statement of Daniel J. Haughton, Lock.
heed Chairman) [hereinafter cited as Senate Lockheed Hearings]; Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1975,
at 6, col. 2; Wall St. J., July 30, 1975, at 4, col. 2; Wall St J., Dec. 16, 1975, at 7, col. I.
122 N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1975, at 55, col. 2.
124 The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. IV, 1975) provides
that governmental agencies must honor requests for data in their files unless the infor-
mation falls under a specific exemption of the Act.
125 Wall St J., Dec. 16, 1975, at 7, col. I; N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1975, at 55, col. 2;
Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1975, at 5, col. I.
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requiring Lockheed's compliance.'" After attempts at compromise
failed, 127 the federal district court ordered Lockheed to turn the
documents over to the SEC, but took steps to guard against prema-
ture disclosure of the information.' 28
The limited disclosure plan poses questions of practicality. Once
a firm discloses the existence of payments it may be difficult to keep
confidential the specific details.' 29 Other branches of the federal
government, including the courts, less sensitive to the business
realities faced by corporations in foreign nations, may force more dis-
closure or attempt to unilaterally prohibit American corporations
from engaging in certain activities. While limited disclosure in theory
strikes a workable balance between the interests of the stockholders
and of the corporation in releasing information about covert corpo-
rate activity, it would be difficult to ensure that, in operation, the dis-
closure would truly be limited. Consequently the concept of limited
disclosure does not adequately resolve the problem of informing
shareholders of corporate activities while protecting the legitimate
business interests of the corporation.
II. EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
TO CORPORATE PAYMENTS ABROAD
At the present time, SEC regulation is supplemented by the en-
forcement efforts of several other federal agencies which indirectly af-
128 Application For An Order Requiring Obedience To Subpoena, SEC v. Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp., Misc. No. 75-0189 (D.D.C., filed Dec. II, 1975).
137 The district court attempted to sidestep the provisions of the Freedom of In-
formation Act by requiring Lockheed to give the documents to the SEC with the names
of the recipients who would be identified only by a code. Lockheed would give the
court a key to the code, and the court would grant the SEC access to the key whenever
it needed to learn the name of a recipient. This proposal was rejected by the SEC. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 29, 1975, at 55, col. 2; Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1975, at 5, col. I.
' 2" Order Requiring Obedience to Subpoena, SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,
(Current Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.195,375, at 98,870 (D.D.C. 1975). The court de-
creed that the documents in question will remain under the jurisdiction of the court,
and the SEC may not release to any third parties any information from the documents,
except to a grand jury, until it gives 10 days notice to all interested government agen-
cies and the court rules upon the request for the information. Id. at 98,871. Occidental
Petroleum Corp. also must comply with a SEC subpoena requesting documents regard-
ing possible bribes to foreign officials between 1969 and 1975. Occidental's order also
provides 10 days notice before release of the information. Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1975, at
8, col. 3. BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 333, Dec. 24, 1975, at A-3. The SEC has also
moved to force Boeing Co. and its president to comply with a subpoena. In its plea for
confidentiality, Boeing alleged that the documents contained highly confidential pro-
prietary information. Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1976, at 3, col. I; N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1976,
at I, col. 7. A federal district court issued an order to compel production of the docu-
ments. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1976, at 31, col. I; Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1976, at 2, col. 3.
12° Garrett Homily Speech, supra note 115, at 62; Sommer Disclosure Speech, supra
note 117, at 18-19. The problem of confidentiality is highlighted by the varied reactions
to the somewhat ambiguous disclosures by and to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations of payments by Lockheed Aircraft Corp. See N.Y. Times,
330
CORPORATE FOREIGN PAYMENTS
fect the overseas activities of American corporations.' 3 ° Commissioner
Sommer has expressed his belief, however, that, in view of the effect on
the American economy and foreign relations, the primary responsibil-
ity lies with Congress and the executive branch which must assess the
propriety of corporate activities and 'prohibit undesirable conduct by
new statutory proscriptions and sanctions. 13 '
The Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Justice, and
the Department of Defense have become involved in scrutinizing the
foreign activities of American multinational corporations.'" Under
section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, a corporation may de-
duct ordinary and necessary business expenses from gross income.'"
Disclosure of foreign corporate payments, the existence of large slush
funds, and the falsification of corporate books has led the Internal
Revenue Service to question whether such foreign payments were
taken as deductions on corporate tax returns. 13 " The Code differen-
Feb. 5, 1976, at I, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1976, at I, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Feb. 10,
1976, at 1, col. 8; N.Y. Times, Feb. I I, 1976, at I, col. 6.
13° Recent events concerning the Lockheed Aircraft Corp. demonstrate the over-
lapping roles of Congress and executive agencies in areas of corporate multinational ac-
tivity. The Emergency Loan Guarantee Board, established by 15 U.S.C. § 1841 (Supp.
IV, 1975), administers the Emergency Loan Guarantee Program for Lockheed through
which bank loans are guaranteed to Lockheed to a maximum amount of $245 million.
Recent hearings have evinced Congress interests in reports of Lockheed bribery over-
seas. See Senate Lockheed Hearings, supra note 122, at 25. During the summer of 1975,
Lockheed admitted paying $22 million over the last five years to unidentified foreign
officials and political organizations. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1975, at I, col. 3. Expressing
concern that Lockheed had not advised the Board of these practices earlier, Secretary
of the Treasury and Loan Guarantee Board Chairman, William E. Simon, strongly
condemned the bribes, declaring that such practices can only increase the distrust and
suspicion that is straining our national institutions." Senate Lockheed Hearings, supra note
122, at 1 I. Later the Board said that it would require Lockheed to halt any future
payments to foreign officials or face the possibility of losing the government backing.
Wall St. J., Aug. 26, 1975, at 2, col. 3. Lockheed has agreed to this requirement and has
adopted a new policy permitting only those payments which qualify as deductions for
income tax purposes and which comply with U.S. and foreign laws. Hearings on Political
Contributions to Foreign Governments Before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corps. of the Senate
Foreign Relations Comm., 94th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 12, at 346 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Hearings on Political Contributions] (statement of Daniel J. Naughton, Lockheed
Chairman). If followed, this policy would prohibit Lockheed from making payments,
directly or indirectly, to foreign governmental officials. See also House Hearings on Ac-
tivities of Multinational Corps., supra note 108, at 66-69 (statement of Edward C.
Schmults, Under Secretary of the Treasury, Executive Director, Emergency Loan
Guarantee Board); N.Y. Times, Aug. I I, 1975, at I, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1975,
at 29, col. 8.
131 Sommer Disclosure Speech, supra note 117, at 15. The Ford Administration
may undertake a Cabinet-level study of U.S. corporate practices abroad. Wall St. J.,
Feb. I I, 1976, at 3, col. 2.
' 3 ' SEC Chairman Roderick Hill believes the SEC and other government agencies
should coordinate their policies on the issue of corporate bribery to avoid inconsistent
action. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1975, at 57, col. 8.
"' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, g 162(a).
134 House Hearings on Activities of Multinational Corps., supra note 108, at 42-43
(Statement of Donald C. Alexander, Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
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tiates between payments to government officials and payments to per-
sons other than governmental officials. Under section 162(c)(1) of the
Code,'" payments to an official or employee of any government,
agency, or instrumentality of any government are deductible if the
payment would be lawful if made in the United States. Thus, the le-
gality or illegality of the payment under the laws of the foreign coun-
try is immaterial.'" The regulations also prohibit indirect payments to
government officials through an agent.' 37
Bribes or kickbacks to persons other than governmental officials
are nondeductible, if the taxpayer is subject to criminal penalty or the
loss of license to engage in a trade or business under the laws of the
United States or any state of the United States.'" Thus, under the
Code some payments made to non-governmental officials or em-
ployees in foreign countries may be deducted as ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses if the taxpayer is not subject to criminal pen-
alty or the loss of license. This conclusion also follows from the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in Lilly v. Commissioner,'" where the
Court held that an optician could deduct payments made to a physi-
cian who prescribed the glasses which the optician made and sold."°
The Court based its decision on the fact that the practice was
wide-spread"' and that no declared public policies prohibited the
payments.'" Thus, foreign payments to non-governmental individuals
are deductible if they represent a wide-spread practice and, as qual-
ified by Internal Revenue Service Commissioner Donald Alexander,
are made with the knowledge of the recipient's employer and are
made without an intent to corrupt. 14 3 The inducement of the deduct-
ibility of proper foreign payments affords at least a measure of indi-
rect control over the foreign activities of American corporations.
The Department of Justice possesses the authority to deal with
' 33 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § I62(c)(1).
"° Treas. Reg. § I.162-18(a)(2) (1975).
'" Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18(6) (1975). The term official or employee of a govern-
ment is defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18(c) (1975).
' 38 INT. REV. CODE. of 1954, § 162(c)(2). See generally Note, Federal Income
Taxation—Public Policy and the Deductibility of Kickbacks Under 162 (c)(2), 35 OHIO ST. L.J.
686 (1974).
'" 343 U.S. 90 (1952). See Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S.
30 (1958); Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958). But see United Draperies, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1964). See also Paul, The Use of Public Policy by
the Commissioner In Disallowing Deductions, 1954 S. CAL TAX. INsT. 715; Schwartz, Business
Expenses Contrary to Public Policy: An Evaluation of the Lilly Case, 8 TAX. L. REV. 241
(1953).
"° 343 U.S. at 9.
"' Id. at 93.
"'Id. at 97.
143 House Hearings on Activities of Multinational Corps., supra note 108, at 45 (state-
ment of Donald Alexander, IRS Commissioner). An increase in the number of inter-
views by the IRS of corporate executives to gather information on illegal deductions of
corporate bribes may be underway. Wall St. J., Feb. II, 1976, at 3, col. 2; N.Y. Times,
Feb. 11, 1976, at I, col. 8.
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foreign activities of American corporations by enforcing federal crimi-
nal and antitrust statutes.'" Corporate operations may violate a fed-
eral criminal statute prohibiting citizens of the United States from at-
tempting directly or indirectly to influence a foreign government or
its agents in any dispute or controversy with the United States.'"
Ralph Nader and four members of Congress have suggested that the
Department of Justice establish a Division on Corporate Crime to pros-
ecute under this and other statutes what they regard as a "corporate
crime wave"" exemplified by the "numerous and confirmed reports
of payoffs to foreign political parties by major American com-
panies."47 They also recommend the enactment of new legislation
which would prohibit the establishment of a fund for making illegal
payments to foreign governmental official or political figures. Viola-
tion of this statute would result in substantial fines and jail
sentences.'"
The foreign activities may also raise questions regarding possible
antitrust violations. The Department of Justice has concluded that
"payments to foreign governmental officials, could be the subject of
[an] antitrust suit where they were part of a scheme to restrain or
monopolize U.S. imports or exports ......49 The Department also
noted, however, that it would weigh the doctrines of sovereign
immunity,'5° act of state,'" and foreign governmental compulsion,'52
"' Under the Federal Trade Commission Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1970), the
Federal Trade Commission has broad authority to investigate the organization, busi-
ness, conduct, practices and management of any coporation engaged in commerce, and
under the Federal Trade Commission Act § 5; 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970) may declare des-
ignated practices an unfair method of competition. In addition to authority to
scrutinize corporate activities for possible antitrust violations under the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 21 (1970), and the Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970),
the Federal Trade Commission may establish other "unfair" means of competition. See,
e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972). It is arguable that a corpo-
ration seeking to obtain foreign contracts by bribes may place its competitors at an un-
fair disadvantage. See Letter from Sen. Lee Metcalf, Rep. Benjamin Rosenthal, Rep.
Toby Moffett, Rep. Thomas Downey, Ralph Nader and Mark Green to Hon. Edward
H. Levi, Aug. 22, 1975, at 7, on file at the offices of the Boston College Industrial and
Commercial Law Review. The F.T.C.'s authority to curtail activities abroad by U.S. corpo-
rations has been questioned. Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1975, at 22, col. 4.
142 18 U.S.C. §953 (1970).
'46 Letter from Sen. Lee Metcalf, Rep. Benjamin Rosenthal, Rep. Toby Moffett,
Rep. Thomas Downey, Ralph Nader And Mark Green to Hon. Edward H. Levi, Aug.
22,1975, at 25, on file at the offices of the Boston ,College Industrial and Commercial Law Review.
'4' Id. at I.
'4" Id. at 5-6. See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
° Hearings on Activities of Multinational Cotps., supra note 108, at 89 (Testimony
of Donald I. Baker, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division) [hereinafter
cited as Baker Testimony). The main antitrust weapons are §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ I, 2 (1970).
"° Baker Testimony, supra note 149, at 89.
'5' Id. See Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 404 (1964). See
also Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (CD. Cal.
1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
'62 Baker Testimony, supra note 149, at,89. See H. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS
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and considerations of comity's° in deciding whether to institute an an-
titrust suit.'" These defenses may minimize any regulation of corpo-
rate conduct abroad by the Justice Department on the basis of the an-
titrust statutes.
The Department of Defense (DOD) occupies a unique position
with respect to the foreign payments controversy. Acting as the mid-
dleman in the purchase of U.S. arms by foreign governments, the
DOD must determine whether to allow the payment of agent's fees as
part of the selling costs of foreign military sales (FMS) contracts.' 55
The Department's Armed Service Procurement Regulation (ASPR)
authorizes the payment of contingent agent's fees to "bona fide em-
ployees" and "bona fide established commercial or selling agencies" if
the fee is "reasonable" and allocable to the specific contract in
question.' 56
404-08 (2d ed. 1952). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 40 (1965).
'" Baker Testimony, supra note 149, at 89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965).
1 " Several situations must be distinguished. An attempt by a group of American
firms or a domestic monopolist to bribe foreign officials to tie up the main foreign
source of an essential raw material used in the United States would give rise to a claim
for relief under the antitrust laws, subject to the defense that the essential act consti-
tutes an act of state. See United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). Pay-
ments for favorable consideration in general, payments of foreign government fees or
contributions, and payments for specific preferences in foreign government procure-
ment would not in themselves constitute antitrust violations because such payments
would not likely have any direct and identifiable effect on U.S. foreign commerce. But
see Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 (1962)
where the Court noted that "acts which are in themselves legal lose that character when
they become constituent elements of an unlawful scheme,"
The impact of payments to procure foreign government action is uncertain. See
House Hearings on Activities of Multinational Corps, (Statement of Donald R. Baker), supra
note 108, at 90-94. Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in an International Teapot?, 8
CORNELL limn. L.J. 16 (1974). On the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws, see
Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J.
639 (1954); Miller, Extraterritorial Effects of Trade Regulation, I I 1 U. PA. L. REV. 1092
(1963).
I" House Hearings on Activities of Multinational Corps., supra note 108, at 128-29
(Statement of Brig. Gen. James W. Stansberry, Deputy Ass't Sec. of Defense, Procure-
ment, Installations, and Logistics) [hereinafter cited as Stansberry Statement]. Wall St.
J., Feb. 27, 1976, at 16, col. I.
156 Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR)111-503, 1-505.2, 1-505.4 et
seq. (1974). Stansberry Statement, supra note 155, at 129-32. ASPR 31-505.4(e) provides
that "any agency or agent is not 'bona fide' which seeks to obtain any Government con-
tract or contracts for its principals through the use of improper influence or which
holds itself out as being able to obtain any Government contract or contracts through
improper influence." Improper influence is defined in ASPR11-504. See
ASPR1115-205.37 (defining selling costs), 15-107 (allocation of indirect costs), 15-201.4
(defining allocability); 15-203 (defining indirect costs), 15-205.31 (dealing with allow-
ability of consultant fees). Commissions have been questioned by the Defense Contract
Audit Agency for a variety of reasons. See House Hearings on Activities of Multinational
Corps., supra note 108, at 146-47 (Statement of Charles 0. Starrett, Jr., Assistant Direc-
tor, Policy and Plans, Defense Contract Audit Agency, Department of Defense)..
334
CORPORATE FOREIGN PAYMENTS
What constitutes reasonableness is often difficult to determine.
The ASPR states that compensation "should not be excessive as com-
pared with the fees customarily allowed in the trade concerned for
similar services related to commercial (non-Government) business."'"
However, the scarcity of data regarding fees paid to agents by com-
mercial businesses resulted in a 1973 directive that "[tjhe basic test of
reasonableness is an assessment of the services provided compared to
the amount of the fee."'" The workability of this test depends on the
Department's success in obtaining a verified accounting of the actual
services performed by the agents. In large contracts where agents'
fees add up to millions of dollars, it is often impossible to obtain an ac-
curate accounting of the services rendered and to verify the fact that
those particular services produced the contract. Recognizing these
shortcomings, the DOD adopted a policy of notifying foreign gov-
ernments when it is unable to determine that a fee is reasonable.'"
The countries of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel have re-
quested that no fees for an agent's services be included in contracts
unless allowed by the foreign government in advance. 16° However,
the DOD's decision to approve a fee is reviewed by Congress only
where the deal for military weapons exceeds $25 million and is under
the auspices of the United States government.'" Thus, while the De-
partment has drawn congressional criticism for its approval of mul-
timillion dollar fees in FMS contracts, few, if any, changes have been
effected in its policies.'"
157 ASPR91-505.4(a). The factors bearing on the reasonableness of a specific cost
(i) whether the cost is of a type generally recognized as ordinary and
necessary for the conduct of the contractor's business or the performance
of the contract; (ii) the restraints or requirements imposed by such factors
as generally accepted sound business practices, arm's length bargaining,
Federal and State laws and regulations, and contract terms and specifica-
tions; (iii) the action that a prudent businessman would take in the circum-
stances, considering his responsibilities tit the owners of the business, his
employees, his customers, the Government and the public at large; and (iv)
significant deviations from the established practices of the contractor
which may unjustifiably increase the contract costs.
ASP/0115-201.3. See generally Stansberry Statement, supra note 155, at 7-8. See also
proposed ruling by Dept of State regarding contingent fees and commissions. 40 Fed.
Reg. 37043 (Aug. 25, 1975).
'" Item VIII, Defense Procurement Circular (DPC) No. 117 (Nov. 1973), repub-
lished as Item IX, DPC No. 74-I (Aug. 26, 1974). For the text of DPC No. 74-I, see
House Hearings on Activities of Multinational Corps., supra note 108, Appendix 3, at 214.
15° Office of the Secretary of Defense Directive (Aug. 6, 1975); Stansberry State-
ment, supra note 155, at 132; Wall St. J., Oct. I, 1975, at 32, col. I.
1 " Hearings on Activities of Multinational Corps., supra note 108, at 119 (Statement of
Lt. Gen. Howard M. Fish, director, Defense Security Assistance Agency); Stansberry
Statement, supra note 155, at 132; Wall St. J., Oct. I, 1975, at 32, col. 1.
1 °' Foreign Military Sales Act § 36(b), 22 U.S.C.A. § 2776(b) (Supp. 1976). Wall
St. J., Feb. 27, 1976, at 16, col. 1.
1 " Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1975, at 32, col. I. Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1976, at 12, col. 3.
It has been suspected that the United States Government may have been aware of the
are:
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The congressional response to the overseas activities of Ameri-
can firms has been inadequate. Hearings have been held by various
congressional committees. The Multinational Corporation Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Interna-
tional Economic Policy Subcommittee of the House Committee on In-
ternational Relations, and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs have heard testimony on the subject and proposals
on appropriate legislative action.'" Although these hearings spanned
most of 1975, apparently the only legislation to be reported out of
these committees is a bill authored by Senator Frank Church. The
proposed legislation imposes fines and provides for automatic cancel-
lation of arms-export licenses of those involved in bribes or kickbacks.
The bill also prohibits the creation of dummy corporations overseas as
conduits for arms agents' fees.'"
Individual Congressmen, acting independently of the commit-
tees, have also either introduced or are about to introduce bills reg-
ulating foreign activities of American corporations. These bills focus
on the regulation of foreign arms sales 165 and the monitoring of busi-
behavior of American aircraft manufacturers. Crittenden, Closing in on Corporate Payoffs
Overseas, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15; 1976, k 3, at I, col. I.
"'For example, Gulf Chairman B.R. Dorsey urged Congress to enact legislation
prohibiting foreign contributions by American companies to aid American firms in re-
sisting foreign pay-off demands. Senate Hearings on Political Contributions, supra note 130,
at 13 (statement of B.R. Dorsey).
'" Wall St. J. Dec. 15, 1975, at 2, col. 2.
' 55 Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.), Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.),
Representative Robert N. C. Nix (D-Pa.) and Representative Les Aspin (D-Wis.) want
strict controls over foreign arms sales. Senator Humphrey's bill would: (I) require pub-
lic disclosure of all foreign arms deals, inclUding agents fees, (2) transfer primary con-
trol over arms exports licensing to the State Department, (3) require the President to
submit an annual report to Congress justifying country-by-country foreign military
sales, and (4) allow Congress to revoke any sales contracts and export licenses it deems
necessary in the national interest. S. 2662, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); 121 CONG. REC.
S. 19880-90 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1975). See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1975, at 8, col. I.
Senator Nelson favors requiring the President to prepare a yearly report of po-
tential sales of arms to foreign countries, with authority in Congress to review the re-
port and alter and/or place restrictions on sales to individual countries. S. 854, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); 121 CoNc. Rix. S. 2653, 2655-56 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1975). See
also Lyons, U.S. Arms-Sale Rise Stirs Capital Concern, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1975, at I, col.
2; Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1975, at 32, col. 1. Senator Nelson has also introduced amend-
ments that would give Congress 30 calendar days while in continuous session to veto a
proposed arms sale and would require the President to submit for congressional review
any arms sale which places the amount of sales to a given country over $50 million for
the year. Amend. Nos. 581, 582 to S. 1816, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); 121 CONC.
REC. S. 10449-50 (daily ed. June 12, 1975).
Congressman Aspin's proposal requires annual congressional approval of a max-
imum dollar value of weapons to be sold and limitations on both numbers and types of
weaponry sold to each country and the filing of a statement by the director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency regarding the effects of the sales and the quality of
weapons sold in relation to certain outlined areas. H.R. 7835, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975). See also Press Release from Congressman Les Aspin, Aspin Introduces A77115 Saks
Bill, June 12, 1975.
336
CORPORATE FOREIGN PAYMENTS
ness activities of American firms in foreign nations.'" The legislation
aimed at regulating arms sales would create undesitable consequences
for the depressed American economy. Foreign military sales totaled
$93 billion for the fiscal year 1975, almost a tenth of all United States
exports.'" The dramatic rise in arms sales in the last two years (sales
totalled $3.9 billion in 1973)168 has helped the United States bolster its
balance of trade payments, particularly with the oil-producing coun-
tries of the Middle East.'" The increase has also given a needed lift
to the nation's sagging aerospace industry."0 Thus, congressional ac-
tion to restrict foreign arms sales by American corporations or to re-
quire disclosure of information which could in turn cause the loss of
United States arms contracts to foreign competitors may have a nega-
tive impact on this country's economy.' 71
Representative Nix would force disclosure of commissions paid on foreign arms
sales. H.R. 10144, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho),
Chairman of the Subcommitee on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee reportedly may propose legislation setting mandatory disclosure re-
quirements on civilian as well as military deals. Washington Outlook, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 6,
1975, at 105. The Senate has passed S. 2662, supra, as amended, which requires all
arms deals in excess of $25 million to be sold through the United States Government,
thus allowing Congress to block the sale. The bill also requires disclosure of commis-
sions, fees, gifts or political contributions, together with dates and names, to the State
Department which would be required to submit periodic reports to Congress which
could be made public. 122 CoNn. REG. S. 1916 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1976); Wall St. J.,
Feb. 19, 1976, at 8, col. 2; Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 13, 1976, at 3, col. 1; Chris-
tian Science Monitor, Feb. 20, 1976, at 7, col. I.
'"° Representative Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY) has introduced two bills. H.R. 7563
would direct the State Department to monitor the business activities of American com-
panies in fbreign countries in order to detect any activities which may violate federal
law. Such violations would be reported to the federal agency having responsibility for
enforcement of the law being violated. H.R. 7563, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). H.R.
7539 incorporates the provisions of H.R. 7563, but, in addition, proposes to amend 18
U.S.C. § 201 (1970) to prohibit payments by any American company or its officials or
employees made with intent to influence the official acts of any foreign government, of-
ficial, or political Organization. The maximum penalty for such activity would be
$10,000 or one year in prison or both. H.R. 7539, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See
House Hearings on Activities of Multinational Corps., supra note 108, at 4. (Statement of
Hon. Stephen ,J. Solarz, N.Y. Rep.).
In Wall St, J. , Oct. I, 1975, at 32, col. 1,
"a The State Dept. released the following figures: Foreign Military Sales Pro-
gram by Number of Recipient Countries and Dollar Program Value, Fiscal Years
1971-75:
Fiscal Year
Number of
Recipient. Countries
Dollar Program
Value (Millions)
1971 61 $1,644
1972 69 3,272
1973 66 3,866
1974 70 10,808
1975 . 	 72 9,510
House Hearings on Activities of Multinational Corps., supra note 108, at 162. 	 •
Statement of Sen. Gaylord Nelson, 121 CONC. REC. S. 2655 (daily ed. Feb. 26,
1975). Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1975, at 32, col. I.
"Exports Provide A Needed Lift, BUS. WEEK, March 17, 1975, at 18.
1" The Boom in the Death Business, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Oct. 2, 1975, at 7. For
commentaries on the spiraling rate of foreign arms sales, see _Jensen, U.S. Arrns Exports
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The attempt to pass legislation aimed at monitoring corporate
business or prohibiting specific activities has also been criticized. The
State Department, for example, has condemned illegal activities by
American firms abroad, but cautioned against the passage of legisla-
tion making it a crime for American corporations to engage in ac-
tivities abroad which would be illegal if conducted at home.'" Speak-
ing before a House Subcommittee, Deputy Legal Advisor for the State
Department, Mark B. Feldman, stated that such legislation would be
resented by the host countries as American interference in their in-
ternal affairs. Enforcement would require surveillance of foreign offi-
cials as well as American personnel and would be viewed as an at-
tempt to force American law upon the foreign territory.'"
While the State Department's argument is persuasive, it is sub-
mitted that the United States should at least condemn subversive polit-
ical intervention by American multinational corporations aimed at
overthrowing a host country's government or at creating situations
conducive to such action. Presumably, such legislation would be wel-
comed by host countries, as it would signal an official policy of nonin-
terference by Americans in foreign internal affairs.'" Prohibiting mul-
tinational firms from engaging in local political controversies or iden-
tifying themselves with partisan political activities in host nations
should be left to the foreign countries which should define permissi-
ble activities and establish sanctions. Subjecting the payment of bribes
overseas to domestic criminal sanctions encounters the further prob-
lem that such actions may not be illegal in the foreign country. Na-
tional action by various administrative agencies must, of course, be
carefully coordinated to avoid the imposition of contradictory stan-
dards on corporate activities.
A national solution to the problem posed by surreptitious corpo-
rate activity abroad thus suffers from at least two shortcomings: (1)
Boom, Particularly to the Mideast, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1975, at I, col. I; Jensen, Sales for
Arms Are Complex, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1975, at 53, col. I; Lyons, U.S. List of Arms Pro-
ducers and Exporters Shows More Than 1,000 Concerns, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1975, at 14,
col. I; Lyons, Arms Lobby Relies on Varied Sources, Including Liberals Seeking to Protect Work-
ers' Jobs, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1975, at 52, col. 1; Lyons, U.S. Arms-Sale Rise Stirs Capital
Concern, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1975, § I, at I, col. 2; Farnsworth, The F-16 and How It
Won Europe, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1975, § 3, at I, col. I; Aspin, The Arms Sales Threat,
PROGRESSIVF:. June, 1975, at 10-11.
" 2 House Hearings on Activities of Multinational Corps., supra note 108, at 22, 24
(Statement of Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State).
"3 Id. at 27, 31. But see Statement of Arthur F. Burns, Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board and a member of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board, supporting a
law making the payment of bribes overseas a crime in the United States. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 12, 1976, at 53, col. 7.
" 4 See Address by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, Global Consensus and
Economic Development, United Nations, New York, Sept. 1, 1975, on file at the offices of
the Boston College Industrial and Commerical Law Review [hereinafter cited as Kissinger
Global Consensus Speech]. N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1975, at 20, col. 1. The Impact of Multina-
tional Corporations on Development and on International Relations, U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. 1
ST/ESA/6 at 46 (1974).
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the traditional regulatory measures of executive agencies do not suffi-
ciently discourage foreign payments; and (2) considerations of the
state of the economy and foreign relations present countervailing fac-
tors which weigh against the adoption of a strong position by the
United States. Any national solution faces an additional impediment:
regulation would reduce the freedom of American multinational cor-
porations while failing to control the practices of entities incorporated
in other nations. An adequate response to the problem of corporate
activities abroad therefore requires a transnational approach, which
could take the form of either a code of conduct or an international
treaty covering transnational corporations.
III. A TRANSNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE
PROBLEM OF FOREIGN CORPORATE PAYMENTS
There are several methods of implementing a transnational ap-
proach to the problem of foreign corporate payments. A code of con-
duct could be promulgated under the auspices of an international
body, such as the United Nations, by a group of industrialized gov-
ernments, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, or by an international 'business group, such as the In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce. A code of conduct for multi-
national enterprises envisions the establishment and acceptance of cer-
tain basic principles which would serve as guidelines for the activities
of multinational corporations in host countries.'" Although nations
may disagree on many issues, including transfer pricing'm and the
control over technology exported by multinational firms to host coun-
tries, agreement could probably be secured regarding, at a minimum,
the imposition of an obligation on multinational enterprises to obey
local laws and refrain from illegal intervention in the domestic affairs
of host countries.' 7i
This minimum obligation may, however, be inadequate, because
of the absence of laws regarding bribery and corporate political con-
tributions in some host countries. The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), which is composed of indus-
trialized nations, is drafting "principles of behavioi" for multinational
corporations. The provisional guidelines of the principles, which will
1 " The U.S. Senate has passed a resolution calling on U.S. trade diplomats to
negotiate an "international code of conduct" to halt bribes and kickbacks by multina-
tional corporations. Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1975, at 12, col. 3. The State Department has
also suggested the need for international guidelines. House Hearings on Activities of
Multinational Corps., supra note 108, at 24 (Statement of Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal
Advisor, Dept. of State). See also Kissinger Global Consensus Speech, supra note 174, at 8.
" 6 Transfer pricing involves agreements between an American parent corpora-
tion and a Ibreign subsidiary whereby products are transferred at prices other than lair
market value. For example, a parent may sell goods to a foreign subsidiary at a price in
excess of fair market, thereby lowering the subsidiary's profit on the finished product
and making exportation more expensive.
1 " Kissinger Global Consensus Speech, supra note 174, at 8.
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be voluntary, are equivocal on the subject of bribery. The present
draft of the code provides that multinational corporations should,
"within the framework of laws and regulations of the host country,
observe the best standards set by relevant local customs and practices
with regard to rendering gifts and other benefits to public
servants." 18
 As drafted, the guidelines are keyed to local laws and
customs which may not bar bribery or corporate political contribu-
tions. The principles, however, are still under negotiation by member
governments of the OECD.'"
It is suggested that the final guidelines should prohibit multina-
tional corporations located in the respective member nations of the
OECD from: (1) bribing government officials, directly or indirectly,
through the use of agents, in host nations; (2) engaging in local politi-
cal controversies or identifying themselves with any political side in
host nations, including a ban on contributions to government officials,
political parties or candidates; and (3) *ntervening directly or indi-
rectly in the domestic affairs of a host nation. The OECD guidelines
should, however, permit transnational corporations to continue to
represent their views to governmental officials in host countries, at
least on those issues which directly affect their interests.
Alternatively, a transnational code might be modeled after the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,'" and could initially estab-
lish several generally accepted principles of conduct. Signatory
nation-states and perhaps the multinational corporations themselves
could consult and bargain regarding standards, thereby laying the
basis for the develpment of additional principles. Procedures would
also be created to facilitate the settlement of disputes. For example, an
agency might be established with the power to investigate activities
and make non-binding recommendations which would, hopefully, be
accepted by the parties in interest on a voluntary basis The prece-
dents developed by the agency would also form the basis for a more
formal treaty system to regulate the activities of multinational corpo-
rations.
Another possibility is that corporations, on an individual basis,
through national or international trade associations, or on an industry
wide basis (either nationally or transnationally) could take the lead in
formulating standards of conduct. Some corporations have already
seized the initiative in formulating corporate codes of conduct or
I " Farnsworth, O.E.C.D. Asks Data on Big Companies, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1975,
at 41, col. 8; Farnsworth, U.S. Seeks World Pact on Cdntrol of Bribery, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25,
1976, at 49, col. 2.
'" Letter from Dr. Klaus W. Grewlich, OECD, to Lewis D. Solomon, Nov. 17,
1975, on file at the offices of the Boston College InduStrial and Commercial Law Review.
18" 61 Stat. AS (1947). See Goldberg & Kindleberger, Toward a GATT for Invest-
ment: A Proposal for Supervision of the International Cairporation, 2 LAW & Policy INTL Bus.
295 (1970). But see Rubin, Multinational Enterprise land National Sovereignly: A Skeptic's
Analysis, 3 LAW & POLICY INTL Bus. I (1971). See generally INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF
INVESTMENT: THE DUSSELDORF CONFERENCE ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (D. Wal-
lace, Jr. ed. 1974).
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statements of policy to guide their multinational activities."' In the
final analysis, however, the developed nations, especially the United
States, must be careful in formulating standards to avoid forcing
Western moral and ethical standards on developing nations.
Agreement on a basic set of principles is difficult at present, not
only because of a lack of common interests between developed and
developing countries but also because of the diverse perceptions of
the economic, political and social impact of multinational corpora-
tions. The United Nations Commission on Transnational Corpora-
tions, formed in 1974 to act as a forum within the United Nations for
the comprehensive consideration of the impact and regulation of
transnational business, attempted to take the lead in formulating a
code of conduct's' The first meeting of the Commission in 1975,
however, produced a split between developed nations and developing
countries on the scope and the content of a code of conduct and on
whether such a code would apply to host governments, as well as to
181 See, e.g., CATERPILLAR TRACIOR CO., A CODE or WORLDWIDE BUSINESS CONDUCT
OCT I, 1974, on file at the offices or the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Re-
view, winch declares: "A basic requirement levied against any business enterprise is that
it lounv and obey the law," id. at 8, and "It]he Company will not attempt to influence
such activity [partisan political activity] in any city, state or nation. Caterpillar will not
contribute money, goods or se vices to political parties and candidates, or support them
in any way," id. at 10; LOCKHEED POLICY ON THE SELECTION AND USE OE INTERNATIONAL
CoNsurrems, reprinted in House Hearings on Activities of Multinational Corps., supra note
I OS, at 167-69; POLICY STATEMENT oF CITIES SERVICE Co., reprinted in House Hearings on
Activities of Multinational Corps., supra note 108, at 184. See also Utcrito STATES CHAMBER
or COMMERCE. ELEMENTS OF GLOBAL BUSINESS CONDUCE FOR POSSIBLE I NCLUSIoN IN
INDIVIDUAL CONIPANY STATES1ENTS at 2 (Jan. 1975); INTERNATIONAL. CHAMBER Or
COMMERCE. GUIDELINES FOR I N'I'ERNATIONA I. INVESTMENT at 12-13 (1972), both on file at
the offices of the Boston College Industrial and Commercial taw Review.
Resolutions by the Board of Directors of Ashland Oil pursuant to the final
judgment entered against the corporation, see text at notes 101-107 supra, provide fin'
sanctions in the form of "appropriate disciplinary action" for violation of corporate pol-
icy (I) against contributions of awinnute funds to public of (2) against il-
legal payments from corporate funds; and (3) against the maintenance of undisclosed
corporate funds. It REPORT or TI1E SPECIAL COMMITTEE Tti Tifil BOARD OF DIRECTORS or
ASHLAND 011„ INC. Exhibits R-2, R-3, R-4 (June 26, 1975).
United Brands is in the process of formulating a code of conduct for the com-
pany. Wall St. J., Aug. 19, 1975, at 7, col. I. The Investor Responsibility Research
Center, Inc. notes in its report, "The Corporate Watergate," that a number of experts
fed that companies can themselves control questionable tictivides abroad. The Center
believes corporations wishing to prevent unethical or illegal behavior could: (I) adopt a
statement of practices to be avoided with severe disciplinary penalties for violations, (2)
implement controls to monitor tile behavior of employees, (3) utilize outside directors to
monitor the conduct of senior corporate officials, and (4) make public information such
as a brief description of the company's policies and a statement of any "untoward"
transactions, or the lack thereof, which have occured. N.Y, Times, Nov. 10, 1975, at 52,
col. I. See also N.Y. Times., Feb. 2, 1976, at 35, col. 4; How Companies React to the Ethics
Crisis, BUS. WEEK. Feb. 9, 1976, ai 78-79; See also Brown, Ethics & Earnings, Profit-Minded
Chief At Boldly Tries to Set A Businessmen's Code, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1975, at I, col. 1.
in Commission on Transnational Corporations, Report on the First Session, 59
U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 12, at 9, U.N. DOG E/5655 E/C.I016 (1975).
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private and public enterprises engaged in foreign direct investment.' 83
Agreement appears unlikely. Developing nations, because of the im-
portance of raw materials in a world facing resource scarcities, see
their. bargaining position on the upswing.'" They probably will not want
to enter into a code embodying various compromises and using the
present institutional norms as the starting point for the delineation of
basic principles.
Even if developed and developing nations could agree on stan-
dards of conduct for multinational enterprises, the code or treaty must
include a satisfactory sanctioning mechanism to operate either
through an international agency or through the respective signatory
nation-states. Several problems surround the establishment of an inter-
national enforcement agency. Regulation by a branch of the United
Nations or newly created international agency outside the United Na-
tions might prove too weak, slow, or inefficient. Nevertheless, de-
veloping countries would probably feel more comfortable with a
United Nations agency. Developing nations may also contend that any
international regulatory agency, whether under the auspices of the
United Nations or not, may develop a "sympathy" for the corporate
entities regulated, with business interests taking precedence over
"public interest." Multinational corporations and developed countries,
on the other hand, might desire a transnational regulatory body not
connected with the United Nations due to the large number of de-
veloping countries who, as members, wield much power as a voting
bloc.
It is also possible that business groups, corresponding to bar as-
sociations, could be established to police an ethical code. Such a code
would be most practical if it imposed standards and sanctions on
major global firms headquartered in different nations. Adequate en-
forcement provisions may prove a problem, however. Corporations
will probably resist any code containing strict sanctions unless all cor-
porations in an industry, at least nationally and preferably, interna-
tionally, are bound by the same sanctions and enforcement
machinery. In such event, corporations may prove more amenable to
industry-wide standards.
Agreement must also be reached on the specific functions of an
international enforcement agency. The agency could perform several
possible tasks, including consultation, information gathering, pro-
"3 1d. at 9-10. The disparate list of areas of concern regarding the operations
and activities of transnational corporations submitted by the Group of 77 and the note
submitted by the delegations of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the
United Kingdom, and the United States also indicated the different concerns of de-
veloping and developed nations. Id. Annex I, II at 18-21.
' 84 See id., Annex 1 at 18-19, Items 12-21; Martin & Ricklefs, Commodity Power,
Third World Presses to Stabilize the Prices of U.S. Raw Materials, Wall St. J., July 3, 1975, at
1, col. 6.
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mulgation of detailed regulations with the power to enforce such stan-
dards, investigation and preparation of non-binding reports, and ar-
bitration of disputes, the decisions in which nation-states and multina-
tional corporations would be "obligated" to effectuate.' 88 However, as
evidenced by the refusal of many developing nations, particularly
Latin American nations, to sign the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States,
formulated by the World Bank, 18 ° Third World nations remain unwill-
ing to surrender autonomy to a dispute-resolving mechanism which
they perceive as dominated by developed nations.' 87 Developed na-
tions will also manifest intransigence if they view the agency as unduly
favorable to the interests of developing countries. The functions of
any agency would have to be structured with these concerns in mind.
Other problems involved in setting up an international regulatory
agency include the financing of such a body; the composition of the
membership of the agency—for example, whether multinational cor-
porations should be eligible for membership; the selection of the vot-
ing system; and the corollary question of who will have the controlling
voice in the selection of the top administrators and the personnel who
resolve disputes.
Facing such a magnitude of enforcement difficulties, it may be
preferable to abandon the agency approach and opt instead for home
and host nations to impose sanctions for violations of code or treaty
standards. This approach is not without several problems, however.
Unless the sanctioning is mandatory, home nations may choose not to
invoke sanctions against multinational corporations in certain in-
stances. Even if the sanctioning systems were mandatory, the sanctions
imposed probably would lack uniformity. The transnational code or
agreement should, therefore, contain a requirement that home and
host countries impose sanctions in accordance with due process of law
in the respective nation. This solution may nonetheless be unsatisfac-
tory to developed nations and multinational corporations, as due
process of law of a host nation may allow expropriation without
timely payment of adequate compensation.
'" See Vagts, Formal and Structural Problems of International Organization flit Control
of Investment, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF INVESTMENT 234-45 (D. Wallace S. 1974),
in The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of other States created the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes. The Convention was designed to facilitate the flow of funds to developing
countries by providing arbitration and conciliation facilities to deal with investment dis-
putes between governments of signatory states and nationals (private investors) of other
signatory states. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States, done March 18, 1965, [19661 I U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No.
6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 160.
187 See, e.g., Szasz, The Investment Disputes Convention and Latin America, II VA. J.
INTL L. 256 (1971); Diaz Alejandro, Direct Foreign Investment in Latin America, THE
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 319, 338 (C. Kindleberger ed. 1970).
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Theoretically, then, the formation of a transnational code of
conduct would seem to present the optimal solution to the problem of
regulating the activities of multinational corporations. In view of all
the problems surrounding implementation of such a code—including
reconciling divergent interests of developing and developed nations,
prescribing effective sanctions, and determining what organizational
format the code would ad6pt—it is unlikely that a transnational code
is presently practicable.
CONCLUSION
A meaningful solution to the problem of corporate foreign pay-
ments is necessary if we are to both instill confidence in American
corporations at home and preserve the competitive position of Ameri-
can corporations abroad. Regulation of corporate activity may take
place on several levels: national, corporate, or international. As has
been demonstrated, attempts at resolving the problem of multina-
tional corporate activities has met certain obstacles at each level. The
machinations of American corporations are subject to legal scrutiny at
home. Thus, the disclosure provisions of the securities laws may af-
ford a partial.solution—particularly if the concept of integrity disclo-
sure is given full recognition—as may action by Congress or such ex-
ecutive agencies as the Treasury and Justice Departments. Yet regula-
tion solely by the United States may weaken the corporations' business
position abroad, as competing foreign firms would not be held to the
same standards. A partial solution may also derive from adoption of
firm policy standards by corporations that have chosen to police
themselves. While several corporations have taken the initiative in this
area, it remains to be seen whether the delineation of strict standards
for international conduct is matched by effective self-imposed en-
forcement procedures.
Given the realities of the market place and the international situs •
of the transactions, the only complete solution to the problems en-
gendered by transnational corporate political and financial schemes is
one which would govern the conduct of all corporations and
one to which all host countries would be signatories; that is, a
pervasive transnational code of conduct. However, while some
organizations, notably the OECD, are attempting to formulate
such a code, it appears unlikely that the diverse interests of
the developing and developed nations and the multinational corpo-
rations can be presently reconciled in the manner necessary to effec-
tuate such a solution. Until such an international agreement can be
344
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reached, the responsibility to curb nefarious corporate activity remains
with the individual home and host countries and with the corpora-
dons themselves.
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